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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Tell your brother you are sorry.”  There is no great dispute about 
whether we should teach our children to apologize.  As parents, educators, 
and society we recognize that apologies help heal wounds.  They empower 
the injured parties by acknowledging their hurt and their right not to be 
victimized in the future.  They empower injuring parties to make a repair, 
to regain their humanness by showing that they understand and regret 
having been involved in a negative outcome for the injured party.  We do 
not instruct children to engage in a calculated examination of the potential 
that the injured party contributed to his own harm, or to evaluate whether 
a child’s behavior in fact violated a rule before apologizing; when 
someone is affronted or harmed, an apology is in order. 
Yet in the world of big adult harms we have created a legal system 
that stifles apologies.  Our system allows the admission of apologies in 
litigation as evidence of fault.  Those apologies most likely to be effective 
at healing wounds are the apologies least likely to be protected and 
encouraged under the law: apologies that combine self-critical statements 
with expressions of sympathy.  Because our evidentiary system allows 
only evidence that is actually probative of a legal issue (usually fault) to 
be admitted, it seems there is a misconception that these full apologies are 
evidence that could be used to find legal fault.  Yet there are many reasons 
to question this assumption: psychological studies confirm that individuals 
feel guilt and regret when not at fault; philosophical inquiries affirm the 
propriety of a self-critical stance for involvement in negative outcomes; 
and cultural practice confirms that apologies in the absence of 
blameworthiness are common, well-received, and offered more frequently 
by some groups than others. 
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Part I of this Article details the benefits of apologies to individuals and 
society.  Specifically, apologies benefit injured parties by restoring their 
sense of dignity and power, apologizers by affirming their self-worth and 
morality, and society by decreasing aggression and revenge.  Apologies 
also benefit society by filling a gap in the legal system to address 
emotional and dignity harms, and, as a result, creating litigation 
efficiencies in the form of reduced case-filings and increased settlements.  
Part II outlines the current lack of protection for apologies: apologies are 
generally admitted in the federal system, and the various states have 
adopted inconsistent protections that typically protect partial apologies or 
none at all.  Part III argues that despite common assumptions linking fault, 
guilt, and apology, apologies are made for many reasons besides legal 
fault.  This is intuitive: one can think of circumstances in which people 
apologize for reasons unrelated to legal fault: social custom, feelings of 
shame, feelings of sympathy or empathy, or to restore a relationship with 
an injured party.1  Indeed, apologies are made (and should be encouraged) 
for so many reasons unrelated to legal fault that they are largely not 
probative of the question of a party’s legal liability.  Finally, Part IV posits 
that given their lack of probative value, apologies should be excluded from 
evidence.  And, because the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the 
admission of evidence in the Federal Courts and act as a model for many 
state courts, the best way to ensure wide-apology-encouraging protection 
is to create an exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence that excludes 
apologies.  Part IV also addresses common criticisms to the notion that 
apologies should be protected. 
II. APOLOGIES TO REDRESS HARM SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AS A 
POLICY MATTER. 
Offering an apology when someone is perturbed or when one 
inadvertently (or intentionally) causes harm or offense does not just 
illustrate that the actor is polite—though it does do that.  Offering and 
receiving apologies is useful for other reasons as well.  They provide 
benefits to individuals and society, in the form of improved relationships, 
health, and emotional well-being, a reaffirmation of societal norms, and a 
decrease in retribution and violence.  Apologies address a harm not 
 
 1.  Christophe Leys, Laurent Licata, Philippe Bernard, & Cynthie Marchal, The Effects of 
Offenders’ Emotions Versus Behaviors on Victims’ Perception of Their Personality: Disentangling 
the Effects of Felt Guilt and Apologies, 71 SWISS J. PSYCH. 187, 188 (2012). 
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addressed by the tort or criminal systems, filling a justice gap in the legal 
system.  And apologies provide litigation efficiencies—key for an often-
overwhelmed court system. 
A. Apologies Humanize Victims and Wrongdoers, Increasing 
Connection, Civility, and the Likelihood of Healing. 
Apologies “function to regulate and maintain social interactions” 
including by acknowledging the harmed party’s injury, vindicating the 
victim, and demonstrating that “the transgression is not tied to an internal 
trait of the offender thus facilitating acceptance and forgiveness.”2  As 
such, apologies “tend to provide positive psychological, emotional, and 
legal outcomes for both the apologizer and person receiving the apology.”3  
Apologies may “help the injured party to feel less angry and the injurer to 
feel less guilty” in certain situations.4  And, as we teach our children, 
apologies are polite, helpful, and satisfying for the injured party.5  They 
are the expected response whenever a person is harmed.6 
1. Apologies provide benefits to injured parties. 
Academic studies on apologies tend to focus on two kinds of 
beneficial effects to the injured party.  First, apologies have been shown 
to have positive effects on physical and mental health.  Second, apologies 
restore self-esteem and dignity to injured parties.  Both of these benefits 
 
 2.   Rebecca L. Thomas & Murray G. Millar, The Impact of Failing to Give an Apology and the 
Need-for-Cognition on Anger, 27 CURRENT PSYCH. 126, 126 (2008) (citing Bruce W. Darby & Barry 
R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 742, 742 (1982); 
Ken-ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children’s Reactions to Mitigating Accounts: Apologies, Excuses, 
and Intentionality of Harm, 134 J. SOC. PSYCH. 5, 5 (1994); Erving Goffman, On Face-Work: An 
Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction, 18 PSYCHIATRY: INTERPERSONAL & BIOLOGICAL 
PROCESSES 213, 213–14 (1955); Laura N. May & Warren H. Jones, Does Hurt Linger? Exploring the 
Nature of Hurt Feelings Over Time, 25 CURRENT PSYCH.: DEVELOPMENTAL, LEARNING, 
PERSONALITY, SOC. 245, 245–56 (2007); Seiji Takaku, The Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking 
on Interpersonal Forgiveness: A Dissonance – Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness, 141 
J. SOC. PSYCH. 494, 506 (2001)). 
 3.   Chandler Farmer, Striking a Balance: A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence Excluding Partial Apologies, 2 BELMONT L. REV. 243, 258 (2015) (citing Jeffrey S. 
Helmreich, Does ‘Sorry’ Incriminate? Evidence, Harm and the Protection of Apology, 21 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 574–75 (2012)). 
 4.   Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1999). 
 5.   Takaku, supra note 2, at 495. 
 6.   See Thomas & Millar, supra note 2, at 127 (citing Naomi Sugimoto, Norms of Apology 
Depicted in U.S. American and Japanese Literature on Manners and Etiquette, 22 INT’L J. 
INTERCULTURAL REL. 251, 253–55 (1998)). 
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may relate, in part, to the capacity of apologies to induce forgiveness. 
It is both intuitive and confirmed by research that apologies facilitate 
forgiveness.7  Individuals who have been hurt by another commonly 
experience a stress reaction associated with many negative emotions 
including “anger, hatred, hostility, resentment, bitterness, fear, and 
anxiety.”8  Individuals who have been victimized “commonly experience 
feelings of injustice and want actions to be taken to restore justice.”9  
Research suggests that the process of forgiveness serves as an effective 
coping mechanism through which an injured party is able to replace these 
negative emotions and stress reactions with more positive ones.10  It 
reflects a “deliberate attempt to let go of negative emotions towards the 
offender and refrain from causing the offender harm even if considered 
deserved.”11  Though the process of forgiveness is complex,12 this process 
appears to be facilitated by effective apologies. 
Studies have suggested this may be because an apology breaks the 
perceived link between the transgression and the underlying traits of the 
transgressor, which facilitates forgiveness.13  Another theory is that 
apologies lead injured parties to take a more benevolent view of 
transgressors and hold them less responsible for the transgressions 
(because the injured party is more likely to view the “transgressions as less 
internal, less controllable, and less stable”).14  This, “in turn, increase[s] 
 
 7.   See Joost M. Leunissen, David de Cremer, Christopher P. Reinders Folmer, & Marius van 
Dijke, The Apology Mismatch: Asymmetries Between Victim’s Need for Apologies and Perpetrator’s 
Willingness to Apologize, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 315, 322 (2013) (concluding, among 
other things, that victims tend to forgive transgressors more often when they receive an apology); 
Takaku, supra note 2, at 496.  Relatedly, unforgiveness has been “hypothesized to be directly related 
to the amount of remaining injustice being experienced (called the injustice gap, by Exline et al. 
2003).”  Everett L. Worthington, Jr., Charlotte Van Oyen Witvliet, Pietro Pietrini, & Andrea J. Miller, 
Forgiveness, Health, and Well-Being: A Review of Evidence for Emotional Versus Decisional 
Forgiveness, Dispositional Forgivingness, and Reduced Unforgiveness, 30 J. BEHAV. MED. 291, 292 
(2007). 
 8.   Kelly S. Flanagan, Kristin K. Vanden Hoek, Jennifer M. Ranter, & Holly A. Reich, The 
Potential of Forgiveness as a Response for Coping with Negative Peer Experiences, 35 J. 
ADOLESCENCE 1215, 1216 (2012) (citing EVERETT L. WORTHINGTON, JR., FORGIVENESS AND 
RECONCILIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATION (2006)). 
 9.   Michael Wenzel & Tyler G. Okimoto, How Acts of Forgiveness Restore a Sense of Justice: 
Addressing Status/Power and Value Concerns Raised by Transgressions, 40 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 401, 
401 (2010). 
 10.   Flanagan et al., supra note 8, at 1216, 1221. 
 11.   Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 401 (emphasis in original). 
 12.   Flanagan et al., supra note 8, at 1216. 
 13.   Takaku, supra note 2, at 495. 
 14.   Id. 
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the likelihood of forgiveness.”15  Relatedly, when victims are able to 
empathize with the “perspective of the transgressor,” apologies are more 
likely to bring about forgiveness.16  Whatever the underlying 
psychological reasons for this phenomenon, the link between apology and 
forgiveness is well-supported.17 
The benefits of forgiveness18 for injured parties are significant.19  
Forgiveness can provide positive mental and physical outcomes for 
injured parties.20  There are indications that forgiveness may improve 
cardiovascular outcomes and reduce chronic pain experiences.21  
Adolescent victims who report higher levels of forgiveness have higher 
self-esteem and lower social anxiety.22  Further, forgiveness can “help 
restore a sense of justice in the forgiver” because “there is power in 
 
 15.   Id. 
 16.   Id. at 496. 
 17.   Id. at 494–96; Leunissen et al., supra note 7, at 322. 
 18.   Unlike apologies which are necessarily between two (or more) individuals, forgiveness can 
be viewed as a coping mechanism by an injured party that is independent from the actions of the 
offender.  Flanagan et al., supra note 8, at 1216.  It has been defined by academics as “a distinct and 
complex coping response that addresses cognitive, emotional and behavioral effects of the offense” 
that “involves transformations within the individual, including a cessation of negative emotions, 
thoughts, judgments, and motivations, as well as an increase in a prosocial, constructive approach 
toward the offender.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Indicators of forgiveness include “(a) non-negative or 
even positive sentiments towards the offender, (b) non-punitive or even constructive responses vis-à-
vis the offender (e.g. comfort) and (c) non-avoidance or even active repair of the relationship with the 
offender.”  Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 402. 
 19.   It is worth distinguishing emotional forgiveness from the expression of forgiving.  Although 
most studies focus on the emotional experience of the victim and the presence of indicators of 
forgiveness, at least one study has found that expressions of forgiveness, regardless of the emotional 
experience underlying those expressions, can both provide benefits to the forgiving party and increase 
emotional forgiveness.  Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 402. 
 20.   See id. at 401; Worthington et al., supra note 7, at 298. 
 21.   See Worthington et al., supra note 7, at 298–99. 
 22.   Flanagan et al., supra note 8, at 1221.  Flanagan reasoned, in the context of early adolescent 
victims, that this may be because forgiveness represents a response that provides victimized youth, 
who often feel powerless, “with a choice in how they want to feel and act in peer situations.”  Id. 
(citing Luke A. Egan & Natasha Todorov, Forgiveness as a Coping Strategy to Allow School Students 
to Deal with the Effects of Being Bullied: Theoretical and Empirical Discussion, 28 J. SOC. & 
CLINICAL PSYCH. 198, 204–05 (2009)).  Flanagan further notes: 
 
This sense of agency may decrease feelings of helplessness and increase 
positive self-perceptions.  Engaging in perspective-taking as part of the 
forgiveness process, might decrease self-blame and dissipate some level of 
anger, resentment, and shame.  For bully-victims, the perspective-taking and 
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forgiveness[:]” it restores power and a sense of control to victims.23 
Even without the ancillary benefit of increasing forgiveness, 
“[a]pologies alone may . . . catalyze radical changes in individuals or 
groups, influencing their capacity to repair and eventually mourn that 
which was damaged or destroyed.”24  By acknowledging suffering and 
accepting responsibility for the actor’s role in having caused harm, even 
lawful harm, apologies demonstrate respect for the dignity and humanity 
of victims.25  They can improve the harmed party’s sense of self-worth by 
demonstrating respect.26  They empower individuals who have 
experienced a loss of power and self-worth by being harmed by another.27 
These effects are particularly strong for apologies in which the 
harming party accepts responsibility for his actions, whether explicitly or 
implicitly.  Such an apology conveys to the injured party that the harming 
party understands that he caused harm and promises not to engage in harm-
causing conduct in the future.28  This acknowledgement of responsibility 
has the effect of restoring power to the harmed party.29  For injured parties, 
an expression of remorse from a transgressor can restore a sense of equity 
and alleviate his or her feelings of injustice.30 
Conversely, failing to apologize, even in the case of lawfully inflicted 
 
 23.   Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 402, 404 (citation omitted). 
 24.   Isaac Tylim, The Power of Apologies in Transforming Resentment into Forgiveness, 2 INT’L. 
J. APPLIED PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD. 260, 269 (2005). 
 25.   See Lesley Wexler & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Designing Amends for Lawful Civilian 
Casualties, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 121, 150–51 (2017). 
 26.   David De Cremer & Barbara C. Schouten, When Apologies for Injustice Matter: The Role 
of Respect, 13 EUR. PSYCHOLOGIST 239, 244 (2008).  Apologies can benefit the harmed because 
“feeling respected signals that one is recognized and accepted, by others, as a person of worth, value, 
and equal standing.”  Id. at 240 (citations omitted).  Ultimately, “respect and apology combine to make 
the victim feel good about himself or herself.”  Id. at 244. 
 27.   Nurit Shnabel & Arie Nadler, A Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation: Satisfying the 
Differential Emotional Needs of Victim and Perpetrator as a Key to Promoting Reconciliation, 94 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 116, 117, 129–30 (2008).  Okimoto and Wenzel explained: 
“transgressions can upset the status and power balance between offenders, victims, and society as a 
whole.  When victims interpret an injustice as a disruption of this status and power equilibrium, their 
status/power becomes a principal concern, relative to the offender and within the group in which the 
injustice occurred.”  Tyler G. Okimoto & Michael Wenzel, The Symbolic Meaning of Transgressions: 
Towards a Unifying Framework of Justice Restoration, in JUSTICE 291, 292 (Karen A. Hegtvedt & 
Jody Clay-Warner eds., 2008); see also Carl D. Schneider, What it Means to be Sorry: The Power of 
Apology in Mediation, 17 MEDIATION Q. 265, 271–73 (2000). 
 28.   Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note 25, 156–57. 
 29.   See Shnabel & Nadler, supra note 27, at 117; Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 310–
13. 
 30.   See Roy F. Baumeister, Arlene M. Stillwell, & Todd F. Heatherton, Guilt: An Interpersonal 
Approach, 115 PSYCH. BULL. 243, 259–61 (1994). 
2020] IT IS BETTER TO BE SAFE WHEN SORRY 179 
   
 
harms, may be felt by victims as causing additional harm.31  Individuals 
who are harmed but do not receive an apology may view the failure to 
apologize as further provocation and as either a refusal to acknowledge 
that harm has been done or as communicating that the harm was 
intentional.32  Where the norm of apologizing following harm is violated, 
the harmed individual is apt to experience increased levels of anger toward 
the individual who violated the norm.33 
Unsurprisingly, failure to receive an apology and the failure to forgive 
are both associated with negative effects for injured parties.  The failure 
to forgive has been linked to depression, anxiety, hostility, and adverse 
health effects.34  There are also indications that chronic unforgiving could 
contribute to cardiovascular problems like high blood pressure and heart 
disease and may also lead to changes in the functioning of the sympathetic 
nervous system,  endocrine system, and immune system.35  By facilitating 
forgiveness, apologies help alleviate those adverse effects. 
2. Apologies provide benefits to apologizers. 
“Apologizing is uncomfortable, creates vulnerability, and is hard to 
do effectively,”36 but can create benefits for those who do so. 
Apologizing can free an injurer of guilt from having caused harm.37  
In many religious and ethical systems, apologizing is an important part of 
moral behavior, such that apologizing can help the apologizer view him or 
 
 31.   Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note 25, at 149–51. 
 32.   Thomas & Millar, supra note 2, at 127. 
 33.   Id. (citing Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno, & Carl A. Kallgren, A Focus Theory of 
Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1015, 1015–16 (1990); Carl A. Kallgren, Raymond R. Reno, & Robert 
B. Cialdini, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: When Norms Do and Do Not Affect Behavior, 26 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1002, 1008–11 (2000); Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the 
Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 527, 532–35 (2001); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi, Toru Tamura, 
Brian M. Quigley, James T. Tedeschi, Nawaf Madi, Michael H. Bond, & Amelie Mummendey, Anger, 
Blame, and Dimensions of Perceived Norm Violations: Culture, Gender, and Relationships, 34 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1587, 1588 (2004)). 
 34.   See Charlotte vanOyen Witvliet, Thomas E. Ludwig, & Kelly L. Vander Laan, Granting 
Forgiveness or Harboring Grudges: Implications for Emotion, Physiology, and Health, 12 PSYCH. 
SCI. 117, 121–22 (2001). 
 35.   Id. at 122. 
 36.   Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note 25, at 159. 
 37.   Negative feelings, including regret, self-blame, and frustration, tend to persist for those 
transgressors who do not apologize.  Julie Juola Exline, Lise Deshea, & Virginia Todd Holeman, Is 
Apology Worth the Risk? Predictors, Outcomes, and Ways to Avoid Regret, 26 J. SOC. & CLINICAL 
PSYCH. 479, 499 (2007). 
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herself as a better person by virtue of the apology.38  Indeed, studies 
support the notion that when one’s actions result in harm to another, that 
individual’s self-image and public moral image is damaged.39  
Apologizing (particularly where that apology is accepted by the harmed 
party) can restore the harming party’s “sense of belongingness and social 
acceptance.”40  It appears to be associated with positive impacts on 
“psychological well-being, positive emotional health and authentic 
pride.”41 
Individuals who apologize for causing harm are generally viewed as 
more empathetic and less unpleasant, and people tend to feel less 
aggression towards them.42  Indeed, even where the apologizer is “clearly 
not responsible” for an undesirable circumstance, the party receiving an 
apology is more likely to trust and attribute positive attributes to the 
apologizer.43 
And, as discussed above, apologies can facilitate forgiveness by the 
injured party.  In addition to benefiting the injured party, forgiveness 
conveys collateral benefits to the transgressor.  Transgressors who 
apologize tend to be viewed more favorable by injured parties and others 
which facilitates forgiveness, and may itself provide a benefit to 
transgressors.44  Additionally, transgressors may be less likely to repeat 
offenses when they receive forgiveness (and more likely to offend again 
 
 38.   Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note 25, at 176–77. 
 39.   Shnabel & Nadler, supra note 27, at 120, 130. 
 40.   Id. at 129–30.  Indeed, giving an apology can restore an offender’s perceptions that they are 
“‘social beings’ acting in line with their community’s normative framework.”  Leys et al., supra note 
1, at 191. 
 41.   Alyson Byrne, Julian Barling, & Kathryne E. Dupré, Leader Apologies and Employee and 
Leader Well-Being, 121 J. BUS. ETHICS 91, 91 (2014). 
 42.   Ken-ichi Ohbuchi, Masuyo Kameda, & Nariyuki Agarie, Apology as Aggression Control: 
Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 219, 
224–26 (1989). 
 43.   Alison Wood Brooks, Hengchen Dai, & Maurice E. Schweitzer, I’m Sorry About the Rain! 
Superfluous Apologies Demonstrate Empathic Concern and Increase Trust, 5 SOC. PSYCH. & 
PERSONALITY SCI. 467, 467, 472–73 (2014) (emphasis in original). 
 44.   See Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and 
Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 291, 298–99 
(2000) (concluding that whether or not someone has been harmed, people view those who have broken 
a rule more favorably when they express remorse, which tends to promote forgiveness); Benjamin A. 
Tabak, Michael E. McCullough, Lindsey R. Luna, Giacomo Bono, & Jack W. Berry, Conciliatory 
Gestures Facilitate Forgiveness and Feelings of Friendship by Making Transgressors Appear More 
Agreeable, 80 J. PERSONALITY 503, 528–29 (2012) (concluding that aggrieved parties tend to view 
their transgressors as more agreeable when they apologize, which facilitates forgiveness); Wenzel & 
Okimoto, supra note 9, at 405 (noting “that victims are more likely to forgive when the offender offers 
an apology”). 
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when forgiveness is withheld).45  But, even when apologies are not 
accepted, they “le[ad] to (non-significantly) greater sympathy for the 
offender, reduced retributivism and increased willingness to reconcile.”46  
Finally, those who apologize may receive a tangible benefit from their 
apology: injured parties tend to recommend more lenient punishments 
when they receive an apology.47 
3. Apologies benefit society by creating a more connected, respectful 
populous. 
Apologies, as a matter of manners, promote civility and 
respectfulness.48  They reaffirm societal values (and the transgressor’s 
acceptance of those values) and respect for others.49  Because individuals 
who “refuse to play by the rules can be a danger to the very integrity and 
safety of the group,” expressions of remorse by rule-breakers can signal 
that the transgressor has internalized the rules and shares the values of the 
group, thus restoring harmony within the group.50  Relatedly, apologies 
have the potential to reduce the desire for revenge among victims and can 
encourage victims to refrain from aggression against transgressors.51  
Victims who receive an apology may be less likely to retaliate than those 
who do not.52  They are effective at promoting fairness perceptions (as 
 
 45.   Harry M. Wallace, Julie Juola Exline, & Roy F. Baumeister, Interpersonal Consequences of 
Forgiveness: Does Forgiveness Deter or Encourage Repeat Offenses?, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCH. 453, 458–59 (2008). 
 46.   Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 415. 
 47.   Alayna Jehle, Monica K. Miller, Markus Kemmelmeier, & Jonathan Maskaly, How 
Voluntariness of Apologies Affects Actual and Hypothetical Victims’ Perceptions of the Offender, 152 
J. SOC. PSYCH. 727, 742 (2012).  Relatedly, forgiveness, and the associated restoration of justice, 
“alleviates [the victim’s] beliefs that the offender deserves to be punished and increases their 
willingness to continue a relationship with the offender.”  Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 414. 
 48.   Within organizations, apologies promote cooperation and help reduce conflict.  See Byrne 
et al., supra note 41, at 103–04; William P. Bottom, Kevin Gibson, Steven E. Daniels, & J. Keith 
Murnighan, When Talk Is Not Cheap: Substantive Penance and Expressions of Intent in Rebuilding 
Cooperation, 13 ORG. SCI. 497, 509–10 (2002). 
 49.   See De Cremer & Schouten, supra note 26, at 244; Tylim, supra note 24, at 262. 
 50.   Gold & Weiner, supra note 44, at 299; see also Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 404 
(explaining that a transgression may be seen “as a violation of values that were presumed to be shared 
[by] . . . the wider community” which can serve as a threat to these values and “the social identity they 
define”) (citations omitted). 
 51.   See Ohbuchi et al., supra note 42, at 222; Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 414–15. 
 52.   Marti Hope Gonzales, Julie Haugen Pederson, Debra J. Manning, & David W. Wetter, 
Pardon My Gaffe: Effects of Sex, Status, and Consequence Severity on Accounts, 58 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCH. 610, 611 (1990) (citing Ohbuchi et al., supra note 42). 
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well as trust perceptions).53  Ultimately, societies in which individuals are 
willing to share and respect the vulnerabilities implied by apologies 
exhibit greater respect for individual well-being.54 
Making amends, even for lawful harms, can “demonstrate to 
individual victims and their communities a respect for their humanity.”55  
They can reduce inter-group hostility, decrease the desire for retribution, 
and promote reconciliation between social groups.56  And they also serve 
to resolve conflict and increase prosocial interactions (even feelings of 
friendship) between the harmed party and transgressor.57 
When apologies work, that is, when they induce forgiveness, they can 
break “cycle[s] of resentment, aggression, and violence.”58  Indeed, 
forgiveness “is central to the containment of social conflict, [and] the 
maintenance of social relationships . . . .”59  It recreates a sense of justice 
by restoring the belief that the offender shares the same values of the 
victim and by returning status and power to the victim “thus correct[ing] 
a status/power imbalance caused by the transgression . . . .”60  And, 
through the restoration of justice, forgiveness offers “benefits in terms of 
de-escalation, reconciliation and peace.”61 
B. Apologies Redress Harms Distinct from Those Addressed by the Tort 
System. 
Addressing emotional injuries and harm to dignity is not generally the 
work of the legal system in the U.S.  The tort and criminal systems focus 
on physical and economic injuries—and, in the case of the criminal 
system, the societal harms that arise from someone breaking the rules.  
 
 53.   De Cremer & Schouten, supra note 26, at 244. 
 54.   See generally Brené Brown, DARING GREATLY: HOW THE COURAGE TO BE VULNERABLE 
TRANSFORMS THE WAY WE LIVE, LOVE, PARENT, AND LEAD (1st ed. 2012) (discussing vulnerability, 
shame, apology, and their impacts on society). 
 55.   Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note 25, at 153 (emphasis added). 
 56.   Diana J. Leonard, Diane M. Mackie, & Eliot R. Smith, Emotional Responses to Intergroup 
Apology Mediate Intergroup Forgiveness and Retribution, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1198, 
1202–03 (2011). 
 57.   Tabak et al., supra note 44, at 527–29. 
 58.   Tylim, supra note 24, at 262.  The feelings of insult, resentment, and humiliation that 
accompany the moral injury associated with being wronged motivate injured parties to seek revenge 
and perpetuate harmful cycles of social behavior.  Id.  But, successful apologies can break these cycles.  
Id. 
 59.   Wenzel & Okimoto, supra note 9, at 401. 
 60.   Id. at 414. 
 61.   Id. at 402 (citations omitted). 
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Apologies do not decrease physical harm or economic loss, and though 
they can reflect an individual’s acknowledgment that he has harmed others 
through his violation of a societal rule, they do not displace the retributive 
or deterrent functions of the criminal system.62  Instead, apologies address 
a different category of harms—the delta between the redress provided by 
the law and the full redress needed for the injured person to have his sense 
of justice restored.  The emotional and moral injuries to dignity that result 
from having been harmed reflect this delta.63 
1. The tort and criminal systems create a delta between the 
compensation they provide for injured parties and the redress needed 
to restore the injured party’s sense of justice. 
“Tort law gives victims only money damages; it does not elicit 
apologies, provide care, change risky behavior, or punish.”64  As such, the 
tort system largely focuses on compensatory justice: the notion of 
restoring the situation to an earlier state of affairs and, in effect, “undoing 
the harm done . . . through restitution (returning monetary losses to the 
victim) or reparations (compensation beyond material loss),” i.e. 
compensating the victim with money.65  And, in doing so, it places a 
“higher value . . . on physical injury and property loss than on emotional 
and relational harm.”66  Relatedly, it tends to favor “pecuniary or economic 
losses, such as lost wages or medical expenses, over nonpecuniary or 
noneconomic losses, such as pain and suffering, mental distress, lost 
companionship and society, loss of enjoyment of life, and punitive 
damages.”67  Recovery for pain and suffering or other mental or emotional 
distress has historically been very limited and only “parasitic” of claims 
 
 62.   See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L. J. 85, 144 (2004). 
 63.   See, e.g., De Cremer & Schouten, supra note 26, at 244; Shnabel & Nadler, supra note 27, 
at 117, 129–30; Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 310–13. 
 64.   Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and 
Inegalitarian (but Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 255 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 65.   Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 305; see also Christopher P. Reinders Folmer, Pieter 
T.M. Desmet, & Willem H. Van Boom, Beyond Compensation? Examining the Role of Apologies in 
the Restoration of Victims’ Needs in Simulated Tort Cases, 43 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 329, 329 (2019); 
Abel, supra note 64, at 258 (“The fundamental goal of damage awards in the unintentional tort area is 
to return the plaintiff as closely as possible to his or her condition before the accident.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 66.   Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 463, 490 (1998). 
 67.   Id. 
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for physical harm.68 
The most obvious (and common) tort remedies for emotional injuries 
come in the form of claims for intentional or negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress generally requires an individual to “intentionally or recklessly 
cause[] severe emotional distress” to another.69  Typically, recovery for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress requires more than garden 
variety conduct; the conduct must be unusually offensive.70  And it must 
be specifically intended to harm the injured party.71  As Martha Chamallas, 
who argues that the emphasis on physical and pecuniary damage is 
harmful to women, explained, “[i]n theory at least, the intentional 
infliction of the most trivial physical harm is a legal wrong.  With respect 
to emotional harm, however, the law responds only to severe injuries and 
only if the wrongdoer is of the worst order and deliberately oversteps the 
bounds of common decency.”72 
Recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is even more 
limited.73  In most jurisdictions, recovery is only permitted for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress where the injured party “can prove that the 
 
 68.   Id. at 491, 503–04 (articulating that the existence of statutory caps on noneconomic damages 
reflects this disfavoring of non-physical, non-pecuniary harms). 
 69.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added). 
 70.   See, e.g., White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1210 (La. 1991) (“Recognition of a 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a workplace environment has usually 
been limited to cases involving a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment over a period of time.”). 
 71.   See, e.g., Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. 1998) 
(requiring emotional distress to be “the intended or primary consequence of [the defendant’s] 
conduct”); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 820–21 (Cal. 1993) (holding that it 
is not enough to show that the defendant knew his/her conduct may cause severe distress to any given 
person; to be liable, the defendant must have known that his/her conduct would cause severe distress 
to the plaintiff). 
 72.   Chamallas, supra note 66, at 492.  Moreover, “[a]lthough tortfeasors take victims as they 
find them physically (the ‘eggshell’ or ‘thin skull’ plaintiff rule), victims can recover emotional 
distress only if an objectively ‘reasonable’ person would suffer it.  And courts impose a de minimis 
requirement on emotional distress (which must be severe) but not on physical injury.”  Abel, supra 
note 64, at 307 (citations omitted). 
 73.   Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 795–98 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (providing an 
overview of the different rules across jurisdictions and expressing many of the policy concerns courts 
have in allowing recovery for emotional harm); Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 
411, 425 (Mont. 1995) (“A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress will arise 
under circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission.”); John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1667–71 (2002) (describing how 
emotional distress claims are currently analyzed by many courts). 
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emotional trauma had physical consequences.”74  Others limit emotional 
distress recovery to those who are themselves injured (the 
parasitic/predicate damage distinction) or who are close relatives of the 
injured party and who observe the injury.75 
In the tort system, then, recovery for emotional harm is limited, 
whether that harm is “parasitic” on a claim for physical harm or is the 
result of one of these “independent” torts.76  These limits on emotional 
recovery are often justified by the need to engage in line drawing and fears 
of the potential for limitless liability.77  Indeed, the line-drawing in this 
area has been seemingly arbitrary and has resulted in disparate outcomes 
from state to state and case to case.78 
The criminal system’s focus on retributive justice and deterrence is 
similarly unfocused on addressing the injuries to dignity and psyche that 
accompany being harmed.79  Although there has been some recent 
movement toward restorative justice principles with apologies as one 
method of promoting restorative justice, such efforts have thus far been 
relatively limited in scope.80  Neither system has as its primary goal 
 
 74.   Chamallas, supra note 66, at 492; see also R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 
362 (Fla. 1995) (explaining that “the requirement of a physical impact gives courts a guarantee that 
an injury to a plaintiff is genuine” ensuring that courts do not “open the floodgates for fictitious or 
speculative claims”) (citations omitted); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 73, at 1662–63. 
 75.   Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 73, at 1671. 
 76.   See generally Abel, supra note 64 (discussing general damages and providing examples of 
the often arbitrary limitations provided by various jurisdictions). 
 77.   See Abel, supra note 64, at 303 (“Such claims would create a ‘flood of litigation where the 
injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon 
mere conjecture and speculation . . . .’”) (quoting Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354–55 
(N.Y. 1896), overruled by Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961)).  These fears continue despite 
advances in medicine and technology that make proving mental and emotional distress more precise 
and accurate.  Chamallas, supra note 66, at 493–94; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 73, at 1670 
(noting the concern that “claims of emotional distress are, as contrasted to claims of physical injury, 
harder to substantiate, easier to fake, and harder to value”).  As Chamallas explained, “[c]oncerns 
about fake injuries, the hypersensitive plaintiff, and tracing cause and effect are often no more difficult 
in these contested contexts than in those contexts in which recovery has already been permitted.  Even 
those commentators who are loath to extend liability tend to recognize that these old arguments about 
problems of proving mental injury are now ‘regarded with some suspicion.’”  Chamallas, supra note 
66, at 496 (quoting Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 
55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1298–1301 (1996)).  Chamallas goes on to argue that “[t]he need to draw the 
line somewhere gives no guidance as to the wisdom of the current limitations.”  Id. 
 78.   See, e.g., Abel, supra note 64, at 304–11 (recounting anecdotes to illustrate the arbitrariness 
of lines determining who is and is not entitled to damages for emotional harms). 
 79.   Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 62, at 104–05, 136–37. 
 80.   Id. at 122–26.  The restorative justice practices tried by many communities—most often 
victim-offender mediation or family conferencing—have shown success.  Id. at 131–32.  As Bibas 
and Bierschbach explained: 
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addressing these harms,81 and, likely as a consequence, neither is 
particularly well suited to doing so. 
Even where actionable, emotional distress, like other non-physical, 
non-pecuniary harms, is difficult to monetize.82  Perhaps this is because 
these harms to dignity are largely incommensurable.83  Or perhaps this is 
because we have a moral or emotional aversion to monetizing those things 
which seem incommensurable.84  Indeed, some courts have recognized the 
inability of the tort system to fully compensate for emotional harms such 
as loss of enjoyment of life.85  And the more nebulous harms to dignity 
from being injured such as feeling insulted, disempowered, or humiliated86 
are not addressed at all by the legal system.  Besides the fact that the legal 
system does not generally compensate for emotional harms, there is reason 
 
A meta-analysis of empirical studies found that victim-offender mediation and family 
conferencing (hereinafter “mediation”) was consistently more successful than traditional 
criminal justice in a variety of ways: 82% of victims whose cases were handled in 
mediation believed that the criminal justice system was fair, versus 56% of those in court.  
Likewise, 91% of offenders whose cases were handled in mediation thought the criminal 
justice system was fair, versus 78% of those in court.  The same meta-analysis found that 
78% of victims in mediation were satisfied with the handling of their cases, versus 56% of 
victims in traditional court proceedings.  Likewise, 84% of offenders in mediation were 
satisfied with the handling of their cases, versus 73% of offenders in court.  Those in 
mediation are more likely to have a chance to tell their stories (94% versus 64% of victims, 
and 88% versus 64% of offenders).  They are also more likely to feel that their opinions 
were adequately considered (94% versus 92% of victims, and 72% versus 55% of 
offenders).  They are more likely to feel that the judge or mediator was fair in their 
particular case (88% versus 76% of victims, and 91% versus 63% of offenders).  Those in 
mediation are more likely to feel that the outcome was fair and satisfactory (73% versus 
54% of victims, and 77% versus 67% of offenders).  They are also more likely to believe 
that the offender was held accountable (92% versus 71% of victims, and 82% versus 49% 
of offenders).  In mediation, offenders are more likely to apologize (74% versus 29%), 
victims are more likely to forgive (43% versus 22%), and victims are less likely to remain 
upset (28% versus 57%) or fear revictimization (15% versus 34%). 
 
Id. at 131–33 (citations omitted).  This success seems especially pronounced in the juvenile offender 
setting: Bibas and Bierschbach concluded that mediation reduced recidivism and that those juveniles 
who did engage in further crime after mediation committed less severe offenses than those who 
experienced adjudication without mediation. Id. 
 81.   See id. at 125–27, 136–37. 
 82.   See Abel, supra note 64, at 291–303 (recounting anecdotes to illustrate the difficulties and 
variability in calculating general forms of damages). 
 83.   See id. at 273–75 (recounting anecdotes of people who suffered injuries or losses deemed 
incommensurable). 
 84.   See Chamallas, supra note 66, at 497 (“Many people recoil from reducing emotions and 
relationships to a dollar figure, and consider it degrading and perhaps even immoral to evaluate human 
life and human relationships according to commercial measures.”). 
 85.   See id. at 505. 
 86.   Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 295. 
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to think that it would be ineffective at doing so given the disparate 
outcomes related to other claims for emotional harms.87 
Yet, those insults to dignity are real and felt by injured parties.  
Evidence suggests that compensatory justice is insufficient; the needs of 
injured parties extend beyond material concerns.88  Injured parties desire 
(and potentially expect) redress for those harms, regardless of whether the 
tort or criminal systems offer it.89  Indeed, anecdotes abound of individuals 
who received large monetary judgments but remain embittered and angry 
at the person (or entity) who has failed to apologize, express remorse, and 
repent.90  What they seek, it seems, is a “restoration of justice.”91  Often 
this comes in the form of an apology.92 
As Okimoto and Wenzel explain: 
First, transgressions can upset the status and power balance between 
offenders, victims, and society as a whole.  When victims interpret an 
injustice as a disruption of this status and power equilibrium, their 
status/power becomes a principal concern, relative to the offender and 
within the group in which the injustice occurred.  Second, transgressions 
can violate values that victims expect to share with the offender due to 
their personal relationship or common membership in a group or society.  
When victims interpret an injustice as a threat to these shared values, the 
 
 87.   See, e.g., Abel, supra note 64, at 304–11. 
 88.   Folmer et al., supra note 65, at 329; Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 294.  Injured 
parties find restitution insufficient and offenders are often assigned punishments “more severe than 
equity standards dictate.”  Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 294 (citations omitted).  One possible 
argument for these stronger punishments is the potential that they will deter future harmful conduct.  
Id.  But, as Okimoto and Wenzel point out, “despite widespread use of behavior control as a 
justification of severe criminal penalties, there is inconsistent evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
punitive forms of behavior control (such as monetary penalties or incarceration) for motivating future 
adherence to societal rules.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 89.   Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 292. 
 90.   Abel, supra note 64, at 261–66.  Despite monetary awards, these individuals desired an 
apology, an admission of guilt, an expression of remorse, or an indication that the harming party had 
made changes to prevent the same harm from happening to others.  Id.  For example, Abel recounts 
the story of the father of a fourteen-year-old boy who was rendered paraplegic by a defective lap belt: 
despite being awarded a jury verdict of $3.3 million, the father “‘became angry because Ford refused 
to admit to anything . . . . [he] sat there three weeks through the trial.  It was like they were above 
everybody else, even after the jury came in.  Ford didn’t care.  They really didn’t care.’  His lawyers 
subsequently filed a petition with the United States Department of Transportation seeking to force 
Ford to recall 1.7 million cars.”  Id. at 261 (quoting Ordeal of Son’s Auto Injury Spurs Father to Seek 
a Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1988, § 1, at 39). 
 91.   Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 294 (citations omitted). 
 92.   See Abel, supra note 64, at 262–66 (recounting anecdotes in which injured parties 
minimized the value of monetary compensation and instead emphasized the need for an apology, an 
admission of guilt, or an expression of remorse). 
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validity of those values becomes a principal concern.93 
They go on to argue that any response to the harm must address these 
symbolic concerns “in order to be considered satisfactory” by and “restore 
the sense of justice” of the injured party.94  Beyond the compensatory and 
punitive functions served by the legal system, apologies may further serve 
this  justice-restoring function.95  Indeed, apology has been found to satisfy 
these nonmaterial needs, beyond what is possible through monetary 
compensation.96 
Apologies can also address harms to dignity caused by injury 
anywhere on the spectrum of liability—from no legal liability through 
criminal liability.  Indeed, many of the objections to apology protections 
are focused on a narrow subset of the spectrum of liability—the area in 
which liability is disputed such that the presence of an apology could lead 
a fact-finder to presume the person apologizing is liable, when, without 
that apology the factfinder would not come to that conclusion.97  Yet, the 
lack of protection for apologies discourages apologies everywhere on the 
spectrum. 
This aspect of apologies—their ability to address non-monetary 
harms—may explain why at least some studies have found settlement 
more likely and/or settlement amounts lowered when an apology is 
offered.98  It may be that a party is willing to accept a (lower-than-
otherwise-desired) settlement offer when paired with an apology because 
the apology redresses the injury to dignity, which the party would 
otherwise expect monetary compensation to remedy. 
C. Apologies Can Provide Litigation Efficiencies. 
To date, most legal academics evaluating evidentiary protections for 
apologies have focused on the judicial efficiencies that might be created 
by exempting apologies from evidence.  In particular, most scholarly work 
has focused on the potential impact to the amount of litigation (meaning 
 
 93.   Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 292. 
 94.   Id. 
 95.   Folmer et al., supra note 65, at 330; Okimoto & Wenzel, supra note 27, at 310. 
 96.   Folmer et al., supra note 65, at 338. 
 97.   See Lucinda E. Jesson & Peter B. Knapp, My Lawyer Told Me to Say I’m Sorry: Lawyers, 
Doctors, And Medical Apologies, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1410, 1429 (2009); see also Abel, supra 
note 64, at 264. 
 98.   See, e.g., Jesson & Knapp, supra note 97, at 1422–23 (citing Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 484–86 (2003)). 
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the number of cases filed and the size and speed of settlements).99  This is 
for good reason: apologies have the ability to decrease the number of suits, 
the amount of settlements, and the time it takes for a matter to settle.100  
For example, offering apologies during the mediation process is more 
likely to lead to a positive resolution.101 
Jennifer Robbennolt’s work has shown that full apologies, in 
particular, can drastically increase the propensity of individuals to accept 
settlement offers.102  In her study, participants were assigned to be accident 
victims, and, after reading an explanation of the accident, evaluated a 
settlement offer from the other party.103  Some of the settlement offers 
included no apology, others included an expression of sympathy with no 
acceptance of responsibility (a partial apology), and a third group of offers 
included expressions of sympathy and admissions of fault (a full 
apology).104  When no apology was offered, 52% of accident victims said 
that they would “either definitely or probably accept the offer,” 43% said 
that they would reject it, and 5% were uncertain.105  When a full apology 
was provided, more hypothetical accident victims were willing to accept 
the settlement offer: 73% of participants were inclined to accept, and 13-
14% “inclined to reject it or remain[ed] unsure.”106  Partial apologies 
tended to create uncertainty for participants: “only 35% of participants 
were inclined to accept the offer, 25% were inclined to reject it, and 40%” 
remained undecided as to what course of action to take.107 
Indeed, many scholars have recognized that apologies can be helpful 
in preventing lengthy legal battles.108  And some studies have suggested 
 
 99.   See generally Folmer et al., supra note 65, at 329–31 (discussing several studies regarding 
effects of apologies in tort litigation). 
 100.   See infra notes 101–12 and accompanying text. 
 101.   Mandeep K. Dhami, Offer and Acceptance of Apology in Victim–Offender Mediation, 20 
CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 45, 55–57 (2012). 
 102.   See generally Robbennolt, supra note 98. 
 103.   Id. at 484. 
 104.   Id. at 484–86. 
 105.   Id. at 485–86. 
 106.   Id. at 486. 
 107.   Id.  The conclusion that partial apologies created uncertainty is noteworthy because most 
states that protect apologies protect only partial apologies.  See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying 
text.  Given the conclusion of Robbennolt’s study, it seems society may be losing much of the potential 
efficiency value of protecting apologies by structuring its apology protections in this way. 
 108.   Helmreich, supra note 3, at 574 (describing various sources that suggest apologizing could 
be “legally advantageous,” but noting that “the empirical research is still at an early stage. . . [and] it 
relies heavily on reactions to hypothetical scenarios”). 
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that early apologies can help prevent litigation altogether.109  For example, 
in a British study many plaintiffs “who sued their doctors said they would 
not have done so had they had received an apology and an explanation” 
from the doctor.110  Similarly, Max Bolstad, in his work comparing 
apologies, litigation, and culture in the United States and Japan, found 
significant benefits of apologies in mediation and noted that apologies can 
both loosen stalled negotiations and sometimes prevent impasse in the first 
place.111 
Consistent with these studies, the University of Michigan Health 
Service (UMHS) found that its introduction of a program requiring 
healthcare professionals to apologize to patients who complained about 
being injured in UHMS’s care impacted both per-case payments and 
settlement time: per-case payments decreased by 47% and settlement time 
decreased from twenty to six months after the program was introduced.112  
Indeed, one critique of apology-protection rules and statutes is that 
apologies could potentially encourage injured parties to agree to settle too 
quickly and easily, for too little in the way of compensation.113 
While efficiencies in litigation are certainly a laudable goal, and while 
a rule exempting apologies from evidence is likely to increase litigation 
efficiencies, in addition to providing the individual and societal benefits 
discussed above in Part II.A, focusing exclusively on this aspect of 
apologies misses a key point: most apologies, most of the time, are not 
probative of anything other than someone’s personal feelings of remorse 
for being involved in the harm of another. 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF PROTECTION FOR APOLOGIES 
Apologies currently receive no protection under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and receive spotty protection by the various states.  Because 
apologies can be used in litigation in most jurisdictions,114 lawyers 
 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. (citations omitted). 
 111.   Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 
48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 569–70 (2000). 
 112.   Helmreich, supra note 3, at 574. 
 113.   Yonathan A. Arbel & Yotam Kaplan, Tort Reform Through the Back Door: A Critique of 
Law and Apologies, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1233–34 (2017); see also Abel, supra note 64, at 260 
(reporting one such anecdote: a widow “settled for millions less than several lawyers estimated she 
could have won at trial because” the insurance adjuster was kind and helpful). 
 114.   Bolstad, supra note 111, at 565 (“Perhaps nothing discourages the use of apology in the 
United States today more than the fear of liability.”). 
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routinely advise their clients not to apologize.115  The Advisory Committee 
to the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized that by 
admitting evidence of statements or conduct, those statements and conduct 
are effectively discouraged.116  Indeed, they relied on precisely this fact in 
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures and offers to pay 
medical expenses.117  Attorney-client privilege protections are based on 
this same assumption: that statements are less likely to be made at all when 
those statements are admissible.  Or phrased another way, one way to 
encourage a speaker to make a statement is to ensure that the statement 
cannot be admitted against the speaker in court.  Apologies are no 
different: “the tendency to admit apologies into evidence seems to deter 
the practice of apologizing.”118 
A. Apologies Are Not Protected Under the Current Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
Generally, in federal court all relevant evidence is admissible, unless 
the Constitution, federal statutes, rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, 
or the Rules of Evidence themselves provide otherwise.119  But courts may 
exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from its 
admission.120  Relevant evidence is evidence that “has any tendency to 
make a fact [of consequence in determining the action] more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence . . . .”121 
Under the current Rules, apologies get no special treatment.  
Apologies, like all evidence not categorically excluded, are subject to a 
case-by-case determination of relevance and admissibility—which 
generally means a case-by-case weighing of the probative value of the 
evidence against the likelihood that the evidence, if introduced, would 
result in unfair prejudice.122  Apologies are out of court statements offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted, and are, thus, classic hearsay.  
 
 115.   See Abel, supra note 64, at 264 (“[D]efense lawyers strongly discourage clients from 
accepting any responsibility.”); Farmer, supra note 3, at 249. 
 116.   See infra Section III.D. 
 117.   See infra Section III.D. 
 118.   Helmreich, supra note 3, at 573. 
 119.   FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 120.   FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 121.   FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 122.   See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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Nonetheless, because they are generally viewed to be statements against a 
party’s interest, they are not excluded categorically under the current 
rules.123 
As discussed in Part IV below, given the findings of social science 
researchers, the balancing of probative value and the risk of unfair 
prejudice should result in a conclusion by courts that an apology is not 
admissible evidence.  Yet courts, like jurors, tend to assume that apologies 
are probative of fault (even if only moral fault), and therefore are probative 
of legal liability.  As such, courts tend to admit apologies as evidence of 
liability. 
B. State Rules, Where They Exist, Largely Protect Only Partial 
Apologies. 
Though the Federal Rules of Evidence do not include special 
treatment for apologies, a number of states have adopted rules or statutes 
limiting their admissibility in state courts.124  Massachusetts was the first 
 
 123.   FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).  See also Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and 
Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 824–25 (2002).  They might also come in under the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (“The following are not excluded by the rule 
against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: . . . Excited Utterance.  A 
statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement that it caused.”). 
 124.   See Michael B. Runnels, Apologies All Around: Advocating Federal Protection for the Full 
Apology in Civil Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 151 n.70 (2009) (listing “thirty-five states—
consistent with their characterization by Justice Brandeis as laboratories of democracy—[that] have 
enacted statutes designed to encourage apologies by providing evidentiary protections . . . .”) 
(footnotes omitted).  The following state statutes provide some form of apology protection: ALASKA 
STAT. § 09.55.544 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 32 of 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of 31st Leg.); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (West, Westlaw through Second Reg. Sess. of 54th Leg.); CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 1160(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 302 of 2020 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
25-135(1) (West, Westlaw through all Legis. of 2020 Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
184d(b) (West, Westlaw through all enactments of 2020 Reg. Sess. & 2020 July Spec. Sess.); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-2841 (West, Westlaw through Aug. 14, 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318(b) 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 292 of 150th Gen. Assemb.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.4026(2) (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of 26th Leg.); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (West, Westlaw 
through Laws 2020, Act 545); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626-1 (West, Westlaw through Act 15 of 
2020 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207(1) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Reg. & First 
Extraordinary Sess. of 65th Idaho Leg.); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1-4 (West, Westlaw through all 
Legis. of 2020 Second Reg. Sess. of 121st Gen. Assemb.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.31 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Reg. Sess.); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 13:3715.5 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2907(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Second Reg. Sess. of 
129th Leg.); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. 
of Gen. Assemb.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 233, § 23D (West, Westlaw through Ch. 176 of 2020 
Second Ann. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2155 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2020, No. 164, of 
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state to adopt such limitations in 1986 after a state senator, who had been 
angry when the motorist who accidentally killed his daughter failed to 
apologize, learned that the motorist had not done so because it would 
“have constituted an admission in the litigation surrounding the girl’s 
death.”125  After the senator’s retirement, the legislature adopted a bill 
presented by the senator and his successor that provided a “safe harbor” 
for those who wanted to apologize.126  Several other states followed suit.127 
In all, approximately forty states plus the District of Columbia have 
adopted some form of apology protection.128  But the extent of that 
protection varies widely.129  Some protect only partial apologies.130  Those 
jurisdictions, roughly thirty, typically protect expressions of sympathy or 
 
2020 Reg. Sess., 100th Leg.); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (West, Westlaw through West ID No. 26 of 
2020 Second Reg. Sess. of 100th Gen. Assemb.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-814 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-1201(1) (West, Westlaw through Legis. effective 
Oct. 1, 2020, of Second Reg. Sess. of 106th Leg.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 39 of 2020 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-1, Rule 413 (West, Westlaw through 
S.L. 2020-74 of 2020 Reg. Sess. of Gen. Assemb.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43(A) (West, 
Westlaw through File 45 of 133rd Gen. Assemb.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H(A) (West, 
Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2020 of Second Reg. Sess. of 57th Leg.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 677.082 
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. of 80th Legis. Assemb.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190(B) 
(West, Westlaw through 2020 Act No. 142); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (West, Westlaw through 
2020 Sess. Laws); TENN. CODE ANN. § 409.1(a) (West, Westlaw through Aug. 15, 2020); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of 86th Leg.); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422(2) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sixth Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 1912 (West, Westlaw through Acts 1-130, 132-148, 150, M-1-M-11 of Adjourned Sess. of 
2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb.); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. 
& 2020 Spec. Sess. I, c. 1); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.64.010(2) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. 
Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-11a(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Legis. of 2020 Reg. Sess.); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 904.14 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Budget Sess. & Chs. 1-3 of 2020 Spec. Sess.).  Illinois previously had a statute 
protecting sympathetic gestures, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-1901 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 
101-651), but the statute was declared unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in 2010.  See 
Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010). 
 125.   Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1151 
(2000). 
 126.   Id. 
 127.   See supra note 124. 
 128.   See supra note 124; see also Farmer, supra note 3, at 252. 
 129.   See Farmer, supra note 3, at 252–54. 
 130.   See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061(a)(1) (“A court in a civil action may 
not admit a communication that[] . . . expresses sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating 
to the pain, suffering, or death of an individual involved in an accident . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
90.4026(2) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (same); see also Farmer, supra note 3, at 253–
54; Helmreich, supra note 3, at 569 (explaining that partial apology jurisdictions generally protect 
only expressions of good will, such as sympathy and benevolence but “deny protection to expressions 
of remorse, guilt, and self-criticism”). 
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benevolence but view admissions of fault as admissible evidence.131  And 
eighteen of those that protect partial apologies do so only in the medical 
malpractice liability setting.132  The remaining eight offer protection for 
full apologies—typically defined as statements expressing both sympathy 
or benevolence and remorse, guilt, or self-criticism—but each of those 
jurisdictions offer protection only in the medical malpractice liability 
setting.133  No state currently offers general protection for full apologies 
outside of the medical malpractice context, and nearly a dozen offer no 
statutory or evidentiary protection at all for apologies.134 
As an aside, almost every province in Canada has adopted laws 
protecting apologies in civil cases.135  These apology-protections tend to 
be broad and to protect statements of sympathy or regret that “admit or 
imply an admission of fault in connection with [any] matter . . . .”136  In 
other words, Canadian laws tend to protect full apologies, including 
admissions of fault, not just expressions of regret or sympathy.137  While 
many of the same objections and skepticisms have been raised related to 
Canada’s laws, ultimately, Canadian lawmakers determined the policy 
reasons for promoting apologies were sufficiently important to favor their 
adoption.138 
IV. APOLOGIES ARE NOT GENERALLY PROBATIVE OF LEGAL FAULT. 
Although the current state of the law does not encourage apologies, as 
discussed above, there are real benefits of apologies for the injured party, 
 
 131.   See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 538.229; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061(a)(1); 
see also Farmer, supra note 3, at 252–53 (citing Edward A. Dauer, Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: 
Colorado’s “I’m Sorry” Law, 34 COLO. LAW. 47, 47 (2005)); see also id. at 245 n.15 (listing state 
statutes that protect apologies in medical malpractice and other contexts, as well as cases that have 
interpreted several of those statutes). 
 132.   See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43(A); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422(2); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 9-207(1). 
 133.   See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135(1); see also Farmer, supra note 3, at 246 
n.15 (listing further statutes that protect full apologies, but only in the medical malpractice context). 
 134.   Farmer, supra note 3, at 253–55. 
 135.   See Robyn Carroll, Christopher To, Marc Unger, Apology Legislation and its Implications 
for International Dispute Resolution, 9 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 115, 116 n.5 (2015). 
 136.   See Uniform Apology Act (2007), UNIF. LAW  
CONF. OF CAN., https://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/119-josetta-1-en-gb/uniform-actsa/apology-act-
presentation-dexcuses/1425-apology-act-2 [https://perma.cc/UG4L-6TYV]. 
 137.   Id. 
 138.   See Russell J. Getz, Policy Paper on Apology Legislation, UNIF. LAW CONF. OF CAN., (Sept. 
9–13, 2007) https://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/119-josetta-1-en-gb/uniform-actsa/apology-act-
presentation-dexcuses/1128-policy-paper-on-apology-legislation [https://perma.cc/7L3A-FEGA]. 
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the apologizer, and society as a whole.  This Article does not argue, 
however, that these benefits alone justify federal protection for apologies.  
If apologies provided perfect evidence of liability, these benefits might be 
outweighed by the probative value of the apology.  But apologies do not 
provide perfect evidence of legal liability.  In fact, this Article argues that 
because of the psychological, social, and moral underpinning of apologies, 
they provide little to no evidence of legal liability.  As such, this Article 
argues that a Federal Rule of Evidence protecting apologies is warranted 
because apologies are not, as a general matter, evidence of legal fault. 
We, as lawyers, judges, and juries, assume that people feel guilt and 
apologize when they are to blame for harming another.  Indeed, that is the 
justification for admitting apologies as evidence in any circumstance: 
people do not apologize for no reason; if he apologized there must be some 
reason to think he is at fault; indeed, he must think he is at fault.  Yet the 
reality is that the relationship among apologies, guilt, and 
blameworthiness is not so simple.  Neither guilt nor blameworthiness are 
necessary ingredients to apologies:139 It is common to feel guilt in the 
absence of blameworthiness, and it is common to apologize in the presence 
(and absence) of feelings of guilt.140  People do apologize for no reason.  
Indeed, feeling guilt and offering an apology regardless of fault is morally, 
psychologically, and socially appropriate.141 
And in fact, it is intuitive that there are reasons one might apologize 
that have nothing to do with legal fault.  It is similarly obvious that one 
might expect an apology for wrongs that are unrelated to legal fault.  For 
example, one might apologize because she makes an assessment that she 
has violated a social or cultural norm—“I’m sorry I’m late,” “I’m sorry I 
missed your call.”  Apologies can be expressions of sympathy or 
empathy—“I’m sorry your loved one died,” “I’m sorry you were not 
accepted by your first-choice college.”  One might apologize because he 
believes he has violated a personal norm or standard, for example avoiding 
harm, or because he had involvement in another’s negative experience—
“I’m sorry I got the last available appointment.”  And apologies sometimes 
reflect a combination of these perspectives—“I’m sorry we can’t offer you 
a job.”  Gender and culture also impact the frequency of and reasons for 
apologies.  For example, it is widely accepted that women apologize more 
frequently and for less serious offenses than men.  And apologies are more 
 
 139.   See Baumeister et al., supra note 30, at 258–60. 
 140.   Id. 
 141.   Id. at 260; Helmreich, supra note 3, at 582. 
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often delivered in some cultural contexts than others.  For example, 
Americans apologize less frequently than Japanese; indeed, the Japanese 
practice is to apologize even when one thinks the other party is at fault.142  
What is clear, though, is that an apology, even one expressing remorse, 
guilt, or self-criticism, is not always probative of legal liability. 
Ultimately, three categories of research related to apologies illustrate 
their lack of probative value.  First, guilt and the associated compulsion to 
apologize is morally appropriate even in the absence of fault.  Second, 
psychological research confirms that apologies are not necessarily linked 
with blameworthiness.  And third, societal expectations of apologies in the 
absence of fault coupled with gender and culture differences in apology 
practices belie their use as evidence of legal liability. 
A. Apologies in the Absence of Fault are Supported by an Analysis of 
Moral Propriety. 
As a philosophical matter, a self-critical stance, and consequently a 
self-critical statement as part of an apology, is an appropriate response to 
harming others, even when one’s conduct was both morally and legally 
blameless.143  Jeffrey Helmreich reasons that “people have reason to be 
self-critical of the harms they blamelessly caused” because “harming 
others, even blamelessly, constitutes a misuse or misfire of one’s 
considerable efforts to avoid doing so, efforts in whose success moral 
agents are deeply invested.”144  As such, “[e]ven purely non-culpable 
injurers have reason to take the stance expressed by remarks such as ‘I 
really messed up,’ or ‘I did something horrible.’”145  Such self-critical 
expressions, Helmreich argues, “do[] not imply legal or moral culpability 
any more than [they] impl[y] innocence . . . .”146 
Helmreich provides the example used by Bernard Williams, a 
prominent philosopher: 
[A] truck driver, who blamelessly runs over a child who had 
quickly crawled into the street, hidden from view.  Although 
everyone on the scene, including the handful of spectators 
 
 142.   See Brooks et al., supra note 43, at 467 (citing William W. Maddux, Peter H. Kim, Tetsushi 
Okumura, & Jeanne M. Brett, Cultural Differences in the Function and Meaning of Apologies, 16 
INT’L NEGOT. 405 (2011)). 
 143.   Helmreich, supra note 3, at 582. 
 144.   Id. at 581. 
 145.   Id. 
 146.   Id. at 582. 
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gathered at the roadside, properly regards the fatal accident as 
tragic and horrible, the driver alone feels what Williams calls 
“agent regret.”  He feels a special sort of negative reaction on 
account of being the one who inflicted the damage, even if he did 
so blamelessly.  And, Williams suggests [and Helmreich’s 
analysis confirms], he should react that way.147 
Helmreich analogizes the tension between serious efforts to avoid 
harming others and the knowledge that one has done so to other instances 
in which one is actively invested in avoiding an outcome that comes to 
pass, like being self-critical after missing a shot in a basketball game in 
which one is invested, or being self-critical for messing up a room that one 
was invested in cleaning.148  In the same way that a self-critical stance is 
appropriate in those circumstances because of one’s active investment in 
the opposite outcome, it is appropriate when inadvertently harming 
another, because of the person’s active investment in avoiding that 
outcome.149  In other words, “I’m sorry I messed up” is as appropriate 
when one blamelessly harms another as it is when one culpably harms 
another, and so the apology itself should not be viewed as evidence of 
culpability.150 
Helmreich’s analysis also supports the notion that a self-critical stance 
is appropriate when one blamelessly violates social and cultural norms, 
assuming that the actor is invested in not violating those norms.  For 
example, a self-critical stance (and apology) is appropriate and expected 
when someone is late for an appointment, even when late for reasons 
beyond his or her control (for example, witnessing an accident on the way 
to the appointment).  And in those situations where an apology is culturally 
or socially expected, failing to follow that norm can create a separate 
harm. 
Jonathan Cohen discusses this concept using the example of a hit-and-
run accident.  He explains that “[t]he problem with ‘hit-and-run’ driving 
is not just the colliding . . . but with the fleeing, which is usually 
intentional.”151  When one who causes inadvertent harm “ignores it, acting 
as though nothing untoward had happened,” making “no effort to redress 
or apologize for it,” that behavior is independently harmful because “it 
 
 147.   Id. at 582–83 (citations omitted). 
 148.   Helmreich, supra note 3, at 587. 
 149.   Id. at 582. 
 150.   Id. 
 151.   Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TUL. L. REV. 903, 931 (2005). 
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treats the victim as though one is free to harm her in that way.”152  “And 
this treatment, or mistreatment, is objectively insulting and disrespectful, 
even if the initial harmful behavior was not.”153 
But conduct need not be morally blameless for self-critical statements 
about it to lack probative value.  Self-critical statements and full apologies 
do not imply legal culpability any more when the conduct at issue is 
morally blameworthy than when it is morally blameless, or where the 
moral blameworthiness of the conduct is murky. 
As Helmreich explains: 
Negligence, for example, means different, though related, things to law 
and morality.  Legal negligence, roughly, involves behavior that can 
reasonably be expected to cause harm, whatever the actual expectations 
or intentions of the agent involved.  One can, however, be morally 
blameless while being, at the same time, incorrigibly inept at living up 
to the objective standards set by tort law against negligence.154 
The reverse is also true: one may be a scoundrel who intends to cause 
harm to everyone he meets, but nonetheless manages to live up to the 
objective standards set by tort law. 
Imagine a doctor who perfectly, non-negligently follows the standard 
of care for his terminally ill patient, but who knows about an experimental 
treatment that has led to shockingly successful outcomes in cases exactly 
like his patient’s with no notable side effects.  If the doctor makes no effort 
to obtain the experimental treatment for the patient and the patient dies, 
the doctor could appropriately feel self-critical for his conduct.  One might 
argue that he is morally blameworthy for his patient’s death, and a full 
apology including a statement of remorse for failing to obtain the 
experimental treatment would be appropriate.  But this statement, while 
arguably reflective of moral culpability, would, like self-critical 
statements made after blameless harms, be non-probative of legal 
culpability. 
Other examples of situations where conduct may not be entirely 
morally blameless but is nonetheless completely lawful also exist—the 
owner of a highly lucrative business is perfectly within the law to pay his 
employees minimum wage so that he can pad his pockets at their expense, 
 
 152.   Helmreich, supra note 3, at 600. 
 153.   Id.  The law, of course, imposes liability for this harm to dignity only in specific and typically 
egregious circumstances, such as for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Despite this lack 
of legal harm, a self-critical stance and apology would be appropriate to address the dignity harm. 
 154.   Id. at 582. 
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but the moral merits of that decision would be suspect.  Self-critical 
apologies, i.e., full apologies, are similarly appropriate and similarly non-
probative of any legal question in situations where lawful harm has 
occurred. 
For example, in their article on designing amends for lawful civilian 
casualties, Wexler and Robbennolt recognize that “in the context of the 
military’s lawful killing of civilians, neither the desire for, nor the offering 
of amends, is necessarily grounded in any legal claim.”155  Yet, they 
nonetheless go on to propose a system for making amends, including for 
providing apologies, where the military lawfully kills civilians.156  They 
do so because apologies benefit both those who harm and those who are 
harmed, even where the harm was entirely lawful, and because there are 
often cultural expectations for apologies when individuals are killed, even 
lawfully.157  Another example of lawful conduct that may nevertheless 
merit both a self-critical stance and a full apology is that of justified police 
shootings.  Like in the lawful-civilian-casualties context, a police officer 
may be fully justified in the use of force against an individual, but may 
nonetheless adopt a self-critical stance based on the injury she legally 
caused, particularly where she learns after the fact that while legally 
justified, her use of force may have been unnecessary.  Offering an 
apology under such circumstances could benefit both the officer and the 
family of the deceased individual. 
The fact that remorse, regret, and self-critical statements appropriately 
follow conduct that is morally and legally blameless and conduct that is 
lawful but morally suspect confirms that those feelings and statements 
should not be taken as evidence of legal liability. 
B. Disentangling Apology, Guilt, and Fault using a Psychological 
Perspective. 
While sometimes related to blameworthiness, guilt is often felt when 
an individual has no ability to control the situation or when an individual 
has done nothing wrong.  In other words, feelings of blameworthiness can 
lead to feelings of guilt,158 but guilt also occurs in the absence of 
 
 155.   Wexler & Robbennolt, supra note 25, at 149 (emphasis added). 
 156.   Id. 
 157.   Id. at 149–50 (recognizing “demand-side and supply-side” reasons for designing a system 
of amends for lawful civilian casualties). 
 158.   Baumeister et al., supra note 30, at 262 (“Intentionality and responsibility are not 
prerequisites for guilt, but some evidence does suggest that they increase guilt.”). 
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transgression.159  Similarly, while individuals may apologize when they 
feel guilt, apologies often occur in the absence of guilt.160 
“Guilt motivates people to apologize, to attempt to make amends, to 
try to repair damage to relationships, to confess and seek forgiveness, and 
to change their behavior so as to be more pleasing and satisfactory to 
relationship partners.”161  Adults tend to assume that guilt is related to 
blameworthiness (they “consistently act as if guilt depends heavily on 
intrapsychic factors such as self-appraisal, controllable decisions, and 
malicious intent.”).162  But, “[p]eople’s beliefs about guilt may, of course, 
differ substantially from the actual phenomena and causes of guilt.”163  
Indeed, there is ample evidence that guilt occurs frequently in the absence 
of transgression;164 “culpability is not required to experience feelings of 
guilt.”165 
Social science research confirms that people feel guilty in many 
circumstances unrelated to legal fault.  For example, people feel guilty 
“when they observe others suffering from an undesirable circumstance, 
even when the observer is blameless.”166  They “feel guilty when they hurt, 
neglect, or disappoint others and when they benefit unfairly vis-à-vis 
others or at others’ expense.”167  They are apt to “feel guilty when they 
suffer less or benefit more than others do”—as, for example, when they 
are overpaid in comparison to others.168  Individuals “also feel guilty when 
they hurt someone unintentionally or when another person is seen as 
ultimately responsible for the hurt that they inflict on him or her”—as, for 
example, “in the case of unrequited love” where individuals often feel 
guilty for rejecting another’s romantic overtures.169  Ultimately, guilt may 
arise whenever there are perceived inequities within a relationship or when 
 
 159.   Id. at 251. 
 160.   See Brooks et al., supra note 43, at 467. 
 161.   Baumeister et al., supra note 30, at 260.  Interestingly, “when no communal relationship 
exists, guilt motivates people to distance themselves from victims, (e.g., by reducing contact with 
them, derogating them, and even dehumanizing them).”  Id. 
 162.   Id. at 261. 
 163.   Id. 
 164.   Id. at 259–60. 
 165.   Brooks et al., supra note 43, at 467 (citing Baumeister et al., supra note 30). 
 166.   Id. 
 167.   Baumeister et al., supra note 30, at 261. 
 168.   Id. at 260. 
 169.   Id. 
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one is involved in circumstances that have a negative outcome.170  In other 
words, feelings of guilt can occur without committing any transgression, 
and guilt is often felt in the presence of an injury regardless of 
blameworthiness. 
Guilt is related to the propensity to search for the cause of negative 
outcomes by imagining counterfactual circumstances.171  People “are 
naturally drawn to search for the causes of events, particularly unexpected 
events, that occur in the course of day-to-day life.”172  So, when things go 
wrong, the natural human inclination is to engage in counterfactual 
thinking—that is, to reflect on what happened and imagine how the 
outcome might have been changed in some aspect if the situation or their 
behavior had been different.173  This “mental simulation of alternative 
outcomes appears to guide individuals’ attributions about the causes of 
actual outcomes.”174  In other words, counterfactual thinking leads people 
to draw a causal connection between their choices and the negative 
outcome or to attribute blame to themselves (e.g. “if only I had taken a 
different road home, I wouldn’t have been in that car accident”).175 
Several studies have found that people tend to feel the most regret over 
negative outcomes that are connected to an action, rather than inaction.176  
Generally, “people regret actions leading to negative outcomes more than 
they do inactions leading to the same negative outcomes.”177  Feelings of 
regret are also shaped by societal expectations.178  “Norm theory” argues 
that the degree to which one experiences regret is tied to the extent to 
which one’s conduct conforms to or diverges from expected social 
behavior: 
 
 170.   See id. at 262; Gilad Feldman & Dolores Albarracín, Norm Theory and the Action-Effect: 
The Role of Social Norms in Regret Following Action and Inaction, 69 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 
111, 111–12 (2017). 
 171.   Feldman & Albarracín, supra note 170, at 112. 
 172.   Paula M. Niedenthal, June Tangney, & Igor Gavanski, “If Only I Weren’t” Versus “If Only 
I Hadn’t”: Distinguishing Shame and Guilt in Counterfactual Thinking, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 585, 585 (1994) (citation omitted).  Indeed, “one way people strive to maintain control over 
their environment is to ascribe cause to events.”  Keith D. Markman, Igor Gavanski, Steven J. 
Sherman, & Matthew N. McMullen, The Impact of Perceived Control on the Imagination of Better 
and Worse Possible Worlds, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 588, 594 (1995). 
 173.   Niedenthal et al., supra note 172, at 585; see Markman et al., supra note 172, at 588–89. 
 174.   Niedenthal et al., supra note 172, at 585 (citation omitted). 
 175.   See Markman et al., supra note 172, at 588. 
 176.   Feldman & Albarracín, supra note 170, at 111–12. 
 177.   Id. at 111. 
 178.   Id. at 112–13. 
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For example, the decision to take a certain road from point A to point B 
is evaluated in regards to whether taking this road deviates from one’s 
typical behavior.  If taking a certain road is an unusual behavior and 
something bad happens, then the negative outcome would elicit more 
counterfactual thought of what might have been and hence higher 
likelihood for regret, but if a chosen road is perceived as normal for the 
person then there is lower likelihood for counterfactual thinking and 
regret.  To act consistently with normal and accepted behavior reflects a 
more careful and justified decision process, which affects the degree to 
which the involved actor is held accountable when events turn bad and 
also the degree to which the person would feel bad and regretful about 
the decision.179 
Counterfactual thinking is highly linked to feelings of guilt and self-
blame; indeed, people often attribute blame to themselves following 
unfortunate events and engage in counterfactual thinking that amplifies 
feelings of guilt or shame.180  Particularly where one believes that a change 
in his actions could have changed the outcome, guilt can be magnified.181  
Indeed, in The Impact of Perceived Control on the Imagination of Better 
and Worse Possible Worlds, the authors found perception of control (not 
actual control) to be a central factor in determining whether people 
engaged in counterfactual thinking.182  This interaction is also apt to be 
circular: perceived control increases the rate of counterfactual thinking, 
and through the process of counterfactual thinking, people retrospectively 
exaggerate their sense of control over the past events, attributing more 
blame for the outcome to themselves.183 
By engaging in counterfactual thinking, people often draw an 
erroneous causal connection between their own actions and the negative 
outcome.184  For example, a police officer who shot a suspect but had a 
lawful basis for the use of deadly force might imagine other courses of 
 
 179.   Id. at 112 (citations omitted). 
 180.   See Niedenthal et al., supra note 172, at 585–88; Barbara A. Spellman & David R. Mandel, 
When Possibility Informs Reality: Counterfactual Thinking as a Cue to Causality, 8 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 120, 120–21 (1999) (“Counterfactual thinking can amplify feelings of regret, 
distress and self-blame, and shame and guilt . . . .”). 
 181.   See Markman et al., supra note 172, at 589 (“Controllable actions by the self may be 
especially mutable.  It should be easier to imagine oneself having made a different behavioral decision 
than to imagine an alternative in the behavior of another person or change in a situational factor.  This 
is in part due to the tendency of people to attend closely to their own actions and in part due to the fact 
that when people make a conscious choice (e.g., which tennis shot to try, which job to take), they often 
consider alternative actions prior to the actual decision.”)) (citations omitted). 
 182.   Id. at 593–94. 
 183.   Id. 
 184.   Niedenthal et al., supra note 172, at 585–86. 
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action that could have resolved the situation, which leads her to attribute 
fault or blame for the outcome to her own actions.185  This use of 
counterfactuals and attribution of fault reflects the psychological impetus 
for the morally appropriate self-critical stance discussed above in Part 
IV.A. 
Though counterfactual thinking can lead people to draw an attribution 
connection between their actions and the negative outcome, counterfactual 
thinking (and the feelings of guilt that flow from it) provides information 
about, at most, but-for causation (e.g. if the railroad employee hadn’t 
attempted to help the passenger carrying fireworks onto the train,186 the 
fireworks never would have exploded, and Mrs. Palsgraf never would have 
been injured by the nearby equipment that fell on her when they did).187  
Indeed, even if counterfactual thinking provided perfect information about 
the facts underlying an incident—it does not—treating an apology 
resulting from a counterfactual as evidence of legal blameworthiness 
presumes that the average person is well-positioned to speak to her legal 
liability.  The entire legal profession is built on the premise that the 
determination of legal liability is not so simple; any first-year law student 
could attest to the complicated nature of such determinations. 
Barbara A. Spellman, of the University of Virginia, and David R. 
Mandel, of the University of Hertfordshire, offer an example of the effect 
of counterfactual thinking in the legal context separate from the impact of 
apologies: 
 
 185.   Recall the example of the truck driver who blamelessly runs over the child.  See Helmreich, 
supra note 3, at 583.  His counterfactual thinking would almost certainly be rife with things he could 
have done differently to avoid the accident.  That counterfactual thinking, the feeling of guilt and 
regret that flow from it, and the causal connection drawn from the truck driver do not actually provide 
any evidence that he is legally blameworthy. 
 186.   Or if he had not gone to work that day, or if Mrs. Palsgraf had chosen a different train or 
had been standing in a different place on the platform, or if the passenger had gotten to the train sooner, 
or had not been carrying a box of fireworks, and so on.  See Markman et al., supra note 172, at 593–
94 (noting the same event can often elicit very different counterfactuals).  In Mrs. Palsgraf’s case (as 
in all circumstances) the list of possible counterfactuals could continue indefinitely. 
 187.   See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–100 (N.Y. 1928).  The plaintiff, Helen 
Palsgraf, was injured after a piece of equipment fell on her while she was waiting on a train platform.  
Id. at 99. A passenger nearby had been rushing to board a train that was leaving the station.  Id.  The 
passenger was carrying an unmarked box that contained fireworks.  Id.  As he attempted to board, a 
guard on the train reached to pull him onto the car, while another guard came from behind to boost 
him up.  Id.  This caused the passenger to drop the box, which caused the fireworks to go off, which 
caused the equipment to fall on Mrs. Palsgraf.  Id.  The shock from the accident caused Mrs. Palsgraf 
to develop a speaking disorder.  Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the Case Method: A 
Marvelous Adventure in which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 351, 361 
(1998). 
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Counterfactual thinking can also affect liability and guilt judgments in 
legal settings.  For example, in one study, subjects read a story about a 
date rape and then listened to a mock lawyer’s closing argument 
suggesting possible mutations to the story.  If the argument mutated the 
defendant’s actions so that the rape would be undone, the rapist was 
assigned more fault (cause, blame, and responsibility) than if his actions 
were mutated but the rape still would have occurred.  Similarly, when 
the victim’s actions were mutated, she was assigned more fault if the 
mutation would undo the rape than if the rape still would have 
occurred.188 
The problem with counterfactuals is magnified when apologies, which 
may be based on feelings of guilt arising from counterfactual thinking, are 
admitted as evidence.  These apologies effectively substitute the actor’s 
counterfactual thinking and his conclusions about but-for causation for the 
conclusions of the ultimate fact-finder.  They are, in some ways, his lay 
opinion about his ability to control the outcome by taking different 
actions.189  In fact, this danger is illustrated by the fact that “the features 
of a given situation that are focused on determine the alternatives to reality 
that are imagined” which in turn shapes “one’s subjective affective 
experience with the event.”190 
People are more likely to engage in counterfactual thinking—and 
more likely to draw causal conclusions from that counterfactual 
thinking—in some circumstances more than others.  For example, “people 
are generally more likely to imagine what might have been different about 
the exceptional (i.e., surprising or unexpected) aspects of a given event 
than about the normal aspects of the same event.”191  And people are more 
likely to engage in counterfactuals about things within their control—they 
imagine what they could have done differently rather than what others 
could have done differently.192  People also are more likely to engage in 
counterfactuals resulting in regret about actions more than inactions.193  
 
 188.   Spellman & Mandel, supra note 180, at 121 (citations omitted). 
 189.   Because of the emotional, social, and moral aspects of apologies, apologies are an excellent 
example of lay opinion testimony.  See FED. R. EVID. 701 (stating that a lay person may give non-
expert opinion testimony that is based on the person’s perception and is helpful in “determining a fact 
in issue”).  To the extent that apologies imply an opinion that the apologizer has violated some kind 
of norm, there is no reason to assume that the norm the apologizer perceives he has violated is remotely 
coterminous with legal liability, or even that the apology-receiver shares his assessment.  In other 
words, an apology, at most, reflects an individual’s subjective assessment that he has violated his own 
standards, whatever the origin of those standards. 
 190.   Markman et al., supra note 172, at 593. 
 191.   Id. at 588 (citation omitted). 
 192.   Id. at 593–94. 
 193.   See Spellman & Mandel, supra note 180, at 121. 
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But none of these circumstances leading to counterfactual thinking and 
attributions of fault (unusualness of circumstances, focus on self, and 
action versus inaction) have anything to do with legal blameworthiness. 
For example, parents may engage in counterfactual thinking if their 
child dies of a preventable illness.  The parents might believe that they 
could have prevented their child’s death if they had noticed warning signs 
of the disease earlier.  This belief could be entirely erroneous: it is possible 
that the early signs of the disease would have been impossible to detect.  
However, the parents might still reimagine events in a way that places 
themselves at fault.  If the parents express this belief, or if alternative 
courses of action were presented to a finder of fact, this counterfactual 
attribution of fault could have legal consequences—for example, in a case 
of neglect. 
In sum, guilt can and does occur in the absence of blameworthiness.  
Indeed, it can occur in the absence of any transgression at all or when the 
injured party is himself responsible for his injury.  Engaging in 
counterfactual thinking can magnify guilt and lead individuals to attribute 
blame to themselves.194  But this attribution does not necessarily follow 
actual blameworthiness.  Ultimately, “[f]eelings of guilt in such contexts, 
separate from feelings of responsibility, may be sufficient to motivate an 
apology.”195 
C. Social and Cultural Evidence Confirms that Apologies do not Always 
Reflect Fault. 
As discussed above, feelings of guilt are not always the product of 
actual wrongdoing or a rational belief that one has done something wrong.  
People may experience regret or engage in counterfactual thinking even 
when they have not committed a legal or moral wrong.  Perhaps because 
of this propensity to feel guilt in the presence of injury, even in the absence 
of blameworthiness, apologies are often made regardless of 
blameworthiness. 
This fact is underscored by studies on apologies and gender.  Certainly 
women, as a gender, cannot be said to be more blameworthy than men, yet 
they apologize at significantly higher rates, including when the same 
conduct is at issue.196 
 
 194.   See id. 
 195.   Brooks et al., supra note 43, at 467. 
 196.   See infra Section III.C.2. 
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The propensity to apologize in the absence of blameworthiness may 
also relate to the fact that apologies provide social benefits even when they 
are entirely superfluous (made for things over which the apologizer has no 
control—think “I’m sorry about the rain”).197 
1. Apologies are offered and appreciated where blameworthiness is 
absent. 
The presence and effect of superfluous apologies in our society 
illustrate apologies’ lack of probative value.  Superfluous apologies are 
“expressions of remorse by individuals . . . who are obviously not culpable 
for a transgression (e.g. ‘I’m sorry about your loss, the rain, bad 
traffic’).”198  Apologies regardless of blame, including superfluous 
apologies, are commonplace in our society, and for good reason.  
Superfluous apologies increase levels of trust for and likability of the 
person offering the apology.199  Through a series of four studies, Alison 
Brooks of Harvard Business School, and Hengchen Dai and Maurice 
Schweitzer, both of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, 
found that study participants were more likely to give money or lend a cell 
phone to an individual who offered a superfluous apology than to 
individuals who did not.200  The superfluous-apologizers were also rated 
as more likable and trustworthy by the study participants.201  Indeed, these 
effects were even more pronounced than with “traditional” apologies—
apologies for things the individual could be blamed for (e.g. “I’m sorry to 
interrupt”).202  Similarly, research suggests that people reward those who 
take the blame in ambiguous situations.203 
The results of a study conducted by Melinda Blackman of California 
State University and Elizabeth Stubbs of Case Western Reserve University 
illustrated that the rate at which individuals apologize—at least for minor 
social infractions—is likely “not significantly related to” who (the 
individual apologizing or the party receiving the apology) is responsible 
 
 197.   See Brooks et al., supra note 43, at 473. 
 198.   Id. at 472–73. 
 199.   See id. at 469. 
 200.   Id. at 472–73. 
 201.   Id. at 469. 
 202.   Id. at 470. 
 203.   See id. at 473. 
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for the infraction.204  In other words, whether the apology reflected some 
fault of the apologizer or was entirely superfluous did not affect the rate at 
which apologies were offered.205 
It seems likely that the psychological mechanism underlying the value 
of superfluous apologies is that by apologizing for the injured party’s 
hardship the apologizer “communicates that he has taken the victim’s 
perspective” such that he demonstrates “recognition of and concern for” 
the individual’s suffering.206  But the psychological underpinnings of this 
phenomenon are less significant to the issue at hand than the dual facts 
that superfluous apologies are so commonplace that researchers at Harvard 
Business School and Wharton thought it valuable to study superfluous 
apologies and the study concluded that the receivers of such apologies had 
a positive response, suggesting an embedded social incentive to apologize 
in the absence of fault. 
2. Gender and cultural norms related to apologies confirm their lack of 
probative value. 
It cannot be that women, as a gender, are more blameworthy than men, 
yet there is evidence that women apologize at much higher rates than 
men.207  Indeed, one study found that women proffered 80 percent more 
explicit apologies than men for the exact same conduct.208  Women are 
also more apt to believe that behavior warrants an apology than men.209  
Indeed, in one study, female participants tended to consider their behavior 
as more offensive than male participants and were therefore more likely 
to believe that they committed a transgression (perhaps explaining, in part, 
the increased frequency with which women apologize).210  There is some 
support for the notion that women feel more guilt than men.211  Whether 
 
 204.   Melinda C. Blackman & Elizabeth C. Stubbs, Apologies: Genuine Admissions of 
Blameworthiness or Scripted, Sympathetic Responses?, 88 PSYCH. REP. 45, 48–49 (2001). 
 205.   Id. 
 206.   Brooks et al., supra note 43, at 467–68 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 207.   See Karina Schumann & Michael Ross, Why Women Apologize More than Men: Gender 
Differences in Thresholds for Perceiving Offensive Behavior, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1649, 1653 (2010); 
Gonzales et al., supra note 52, at 618. 
 208.   Gonzales et al., supra note 52, at 617. 
 209.   See Schumann & Ross, supra note 207, at 1653. 
 210.   See id. at 1653–54. 
 211.   Baumeister et al., supra note 30, at 263 (“Thus, for example, if women are indeed more 
prone to guilt than men, then many marriages might readily drift toward arrangements in which wives 
perform more than their equitable share of joint duties and resent their husbands for this.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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these additional apologies are motivated by guilt or not, there is no reason 
to think that they are in fact motivated by additional blameworthiness.  In 
fact, to the extent that these apologies are motivated by a heightened 
standard for non-offensive behavior, it makes little sense as a policy matter 
for society to judge more harshly those who hold themselves to a higher 
standard and are more willing to state that their conduct has fallen short of 
those standards.  By admitting apologies into evidence and therefore 
exposing apologizers to the potential for greater liability, the legal system 
conceivably does just that. 
Similarly, there is no reason to think that Japanese people are more 
likely to be legally liable than Americans.  Yet, they apologize more 
frequently, including when the other party is at fault.212  Finally—and most 
concerning from the perspective of its potential impact on legal 
outcomes—those with lower social status apologize more frequently than 
those with higher social status.213  Perhaps even more troubling: at least 
one study found that those with lower social status had a greater propensity 
to accept responsibility and make “I did it” statements in the face of minor 
infractions than higher-status individuals.214  Indeed, the historically lower 
status of women may be one explanation for women’s propensity to 
apologize more frequently. 
D. The Federal Rules of Evidence Already Recognize that Similar 
Conduct/Statements Are Not Probative of Liability. 
The commentary to several of the Federal Rules of Evidence confirms 
that statements and conduct reflecting remorse, regret, or guilt after an 
incident are not necessarily probative of liability.  For example, the 
commentary to Federal Rule of Evidence 407 excluding subsequent 
remedial measures215 explains that one reason such measures are excluded 
is because “[t]he conduct is not in fact an admission, since the conduct is 
 
 212.   See generally Maddux et al., supra note 142 (studying the differences between the United 
States and Japan in the “function and meaning” of apologies). 
 213.   Gonzales et al., supra note 52, at 613, 619.  The fact that lower status individuals may 
apologize more frequently and make more “I did it” statements in a country in which apologies are 
not excluded from evidence (based on the incorrect assumption that they are probative of liability) 
could result in greater liability findings and convictions for those of lower status.  This subject should 
be further investigated to determine whether the potential for fairness concerns created by this apparent 
discrepancy plays out in actual legal outcomes. 
 214.   Id. at 617. 
 215.   FED. R. EVID. 407 (“When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or 
harm less likely to occur . . . .”). 
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equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory 
negligence.”216  The same commentary and analysis supports the exclusion 
of offers to pay medical expenses.217  Similarly, the Advisory Committee 
reasoned with respect to Federal Rule of Evidence 408, excluding 
“conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the 
claim,”218 that “[t]he evidence is irrelevant, since the offer may be 
motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of 
weakness of position.”219 
The same policy reasons underlying these exceptions apply to 
apologies.  As discussed above, apologies, like subsequent remedial 
measures and offers to pay medical expenses, benefit individuals and 
society and should consequently be encouraged.  In addition, like 
statements made in settlement negotiations, without protections, apologies 
are unlikely to be offered at all.220 
That in some, even many, cases there might be both a moral urge to 
apologize and a separate legal liability should not be a justification to 
discourage apologies.  In this way apologies are also similar to subsequent 
remedial measures or offers to pay medical bills: these actions presumably 
arise from the injurer’s subjective determination that he was in the wrong, 
or at least his personal discomfort with the fact that he played any part in 
another’s injury.221  Each is arguably evidence, then, that at least he views 
himself as being at fault.222  But, neither subsequent remedial measures 
nor offers to pay medical expenses are admissible to prove liability under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence because of a recognition that such evidence 
is not particularly probative of legal fault and because of policy 
considerations that such actions should be encouraged.223  The same is true 
 
 216.   FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 217.   See FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“[G]enerally, 
evidence of payment of medical, hospital, or similar expenses of an injured party by the opposing 
party, is not admissible, the reason often given being that such payment or offer is usually made from 
humane impulses and not from an admission of liability, and that to hold otherwise would tend to 
discourage assistance to the injured person.”). 
 218.   FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2). 
 219.   FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 220.   In this way, protecting apologies can also be likened to protecting conversations with 
attorneys with the attorney-client privilege.  As a policy matter, we recognize the importance of those 
conversations and also recognize that individuals are unwilling to speak freely with their attorneys if 
those conversations are discoverable. 
 221.   See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules; FED. R. EVID. 
409 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 222.   See id. 
 223.   See id. 
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of apologies. 
V. PROPOSAL: A FEDERAL RULE SHOULD BE ADOPTED TO PROTECT 
FULL APOLOGIES. 
The analysis above explains why apologies are not usually evidence 
of liability as defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence: they are not 
generally probative of liability, and because people tend to wrongly 
assume that an apology reflects blameworthiness, they carry with them a 
significant risk of unfair prejudice.  Theoretically, apologies should not 
need protection, because evidence that has no probative value (or evidence 
that has slight probative value that is outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice) is not admissible.  Yet, as discussed above, this particular kind 
of evidence is apt to be admitted regardless of its probative value.  As such, 
leaving the admissibility of apologies to a case-by-case determination is 
inadequate; broader protection is needed.  Further, because apologies have 
societal value from a policy perspective (they are capable of redressing 
moral and social wrongs as well as violations of personal norms), any 
protection for apologies should be mindful of this societal benefit.  To 
address each of these issues, an exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
that covers full apologies should be adopted. 
A. Protection Should Cover “Full” Apologies. 
Partial apology protections have been the norm, presumably because 
they, in some ways, split the baby.  They protect pure expressions of 
remorse, but ensure that any factual material, admissions, or acceptance of 
responsibility can still be used in court.  But, partial apologies do not 
provide the same benefits as full apologies.  Full apologies are more 
effective at redressing the harms to dignity caused by injury, filling a gap 
in the legal system’s efforts regarding victims, and full apologies are more 
likely to lead to litigation efficiencies, like increasing settlements and 
decreasing the number of claims filed in the first place. 
First, as noted above, acceptance of responsibility is a key component 
of redressing the dignity injury.  If the goal is actually to encourage the 
kind of sincere and effective apologies that undo harm to dignity, full 
protection is necessary.  Only full protection can lead to the culture change 
that encourages sincere and spontaneous statements of apology, because 
partial protection requires careful crafting of statement to avoid 
admissibility.  As Helmreich explained, “the context of choosing one’s 
2020] IT IS BETTER TO BE SAFE WHEN SORRY 211 
   
 
words to avoid lawsuits is in itself incompatible with the concessionary, 
open, self-deprecating mindset characteristic of the apologetic stance.”224  
Further, factual material embedded in expressions of remorse are subject 
to the same subjective interpretation (and thus lack of legal anchoring) as 
the statements of remorse themselves.  These statements are prone to be 
the result of counterfactual thinking, which tends to magnify guilt and 
attribution of blame to oneself. 
Finally, full apologies are more likely than partial apologies to result 
in the settlement-generating benefits extoled by many scholars.225  The 
settlement-encouraging effects of full as compared to partial apologies 
was most aptly demonstrated by the Robbennolt study, where partial 
apologies left victims uncertain about whether to settle, but full apologies 
resulted in substantially more victims accepting settlement offers.226  
Presumably, this is because fault-admitting apologies tend to be viewed as 
more sincere.227  Indeed, as Robbennolt concluded, “providing evidentiary 
protection for apologies may serve to encourage the offering of 
apologies . . . without diminishing the value and effectiveness of apologies 
so offered.”228 
B. Protection Should Take the Form of an Exclusion in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
State limitations are inadequate to address the admissibility (or, more 
accurately, inadmissibility) of apologies.  First, state limitations, by their 
nature, only apply to litigation within an individual state.  Cases removed 
to federal court or brought in a different state are not covered.  In a world 
where many people cross state lines daily, a state-by-state approach gives 
little comfort to a would-be-apologizer that his statements will not center 
prominently in litigation.  Furthermore, even though the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not apply in state courts, they serve as a model for the 
evidentiary rules of many states229 and govern all cases in federal courts, 
 
 224.   Helmreich, supra note 3, at 573. 
 225.   See, e.g., Robbennolt, supra note 98, at 505 (noting that it is “full, responsibility-accepting, 
apologies that have a positive impact on settlement decisionmaking [sic]”). 
 226.   Id. at 485–86. 
 227.   Helmreich, supra note 3, at 602. 
 228.   Robbennolt, supra note 98, at 504. 
 229.   See, e.g., Lauren Gailey, “I’m Sorry” as Evidence? Why the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Should Include a New Specialized Relevance Rule to Protect Physicians, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 172, 173 
(2015) (advocating for a federal rule excluding apologies from physicians and noting that “[b]ecause 
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including those removed from state courts.230  As such, even though an 
exception for apologies within the Federal Rules of Evidence would not 
necessarily cover every apology, everywhere, it would likely come close.  
Further, it would likely be much more effective at encouraging apologies 
than the piecemeal approach taken thus far. 
Second, and equally important, most state limitations fall short of 
recognizing that apologies, by their very nature, are not reliably probative 
of liability.  As such, state limitations, by and large, protect only “partial” 
rather than “full” apologies.231 
The resulting landscape is that some kinds of apologies are protected 
in some places.  But, the probative value of an apology is not dependent 
on whether it is uttered in Nebraska or Kansas, and the policy-related 
reasons to encourage apologies are not well served by admissibility 
outcomes that vary by state.  Without a federal rule, protection is spotty 
and inconsistent in state courts, and there is no protection in federal courts; 
such that an apologetic person could not be certain that his apology would 
be protected, even in a region where many states offer full protection, 
because he could be sued in federal court in that state instead.  Consistency 
and predictability are always a goal of law, but they are especially 
important when trying to encourage behavior, and especially when the 
most ubiquitous example of instances where apologies are needed 
involves moving vehicles.  If spontaneous and sincere apologies are the 
best, one who causes harm should not be expected to pause his 
spontaneous and sincere apology to check his map and his local rules of 
evidence and evaluate whether his apology will be admissible in some 
later lawsuit.  If spontaneous and sincere apologies are to be encouraged, 
they should be protected consistently and fully.  Finally, because the 
Federal Rules of Evidence so often serve as a template for state rules, the 
adoption of a federal rule is likely to effectively result in adoption of a 
similar rule everywhere. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence already recognize several 
circumstances in which statements or conduct could be undertaken 
because of legal liability or for some other reason.  For example, 
subsequent remedial measures could be undertaken because prior 
 
many states’ evidence rules are modeled after the Federal Rules, such an addition would be a 
persuasive and effective means of demonstrating the federal government’s commitment to fostering 
the doctor-patient relationship—and of encouraging the states to do the same”). 
 230.   See FED. R. EVID. 101(a) (“These rules apply to proceedings in United States courts.”). 
 231.   See Runnels, supra note 124, at 151 n.70 (citing to thirty-five state statutes that protect such 
partial apologies). 
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measures were legally inadequate or simply to avoid future accidents.232  
Similarly, offers to pay medical expenses could reflect an acceptance of 
legal liability for injury or a benevolent desire to help an injured party.233  
Offers to settle and statements made in settlement negotiations could 
similarly be made for reasons that do not necessarily reflect the strength 
or weakness of a party’s legal position—for example to keep the peace or 
avoid litigation costs.234  In each instance, the Advisory Committee 
explained that this conduct is not actually an admission of fault because it 
is equally consistent with other legal blamelessness.235  In all of these 
instances, a social policy of encouraging, or at least not discouraging, the 
excluded conduct or statements weighed heavily in favor of excluding 
these (at most marginally probative) acts and statements.236  The same is 
true in the context of apologies. 
C. Addressing Potential Criticisms. 
Three primary critiques are typically levied at pieces arguing for 
protection of apologies in the evidentiary system: (1) that important 
evidence is lost by the protection of apologies, (2) that the resolution-
encouraging properties of apologies will be leveraged by wrongdoers to 
promote insincere apologies, and (3) that victims, particularly those 
presented with such insincere apologies, will settle for less than they 
should because they will be moved by apologies.  None of these critiques 
justifies foregoing the rule proposed above. 
1. No evidence is truly lost. 
An obvious critique to excluding apologies, particularly full 
 
 232.   See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 233.   See FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 234.   FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 235.   FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules; FED. R. EVID. 409 
advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules.  This reasoning holds regardless of the particular 
hearsay exception—e.g. statement against interest or excited utterance—under which the apology 
would otherwise be admitted. 
 236.   See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“The other, and 
more impressive, ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at 
least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.”); FED. R. EVID. 408 
advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“A more consistently impressive ground is 
promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes.”); FED. R. EVID. 
409 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (explaining that failing to exclude offers to 
pay medical expenses “would tend to discourage assistance to the injured person”). 
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apologies, in the Federal Rules of Evidence is that some apologies may 
contain factual material that could, in fact, be probative of an issue in the 
case.237  It goes hand-in-hand with a related critique: that offering 
protection to full apologies is essentially refusing admission of “full 
confession[s], simply because the speaker uttered the magic words, ‘I’m 
sorry’ before admitting liability,” which some argue is a “dangerous policy 
and may significantly weaken an individual’s ability to prove their 
case.”238  In short, the argument is that important evidence could be lost 
by excluding factual information contained in apologies.  To be clear, this 
Article argues that apologies are not probative of legal liability.  Indeed, 
the “factual information” provided as a result of counterfactuals is just as 
suspect as the apologies it engenders.  But, even if apologies were 
probative, their exclusion would not result in a loss of evidence sufficient 
to justify discouraging apologies. 
a. Any loss of apology “evidence” is on a micro-level only. 
First, this critique assumes that confessions of liability would happen 
regardless of the apology and that a rule protecting the confession with the 
apology encourages wrongdoers to throw in an “I’m sorry” at the end to 
render otherwise admissible evidence inadmissible.239  But, this 
misconstrues the landscape of apologies.  The whole point of rules to 
encourage apologies is that the social and psychological drive to apologize 
is being squelched by a fear of liability.  Presumably, any loss of evidence 
would happen only on the micro-level.  If one assumes that more apologies 
would be offered precisely because the would-be-apologizer would not be 
threatened with liability implications from his apology, then without the 
apology rule there would be no “confession” of liability.  In other words, 
the impact is only on an individual case, after the fact, when the apology 
and “confession” are excluded, not to society as a whole, because without 
the apology protection there would be no apology or confession of liability 
in the first place.  One point of such a rule is to encourage apologies where 
there would otherwise most likely be none. Assuming that happens, then, 
no evidence is lost on a macro-level because any evidence that is excluded 
never would have been provided if not for the exception.  In other words, 
if protection for full apologies encourages more full apologies and those 
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apologies include admissions of fact (however suspect they may be), 
society has lost nothing from the current state of affairs: evidence is 
excluded that would not have existed but for the rule. 
b. The Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate the loss of evidence in 
similar circumstances. 
Second, the Federal Rules already contemplate the loss of evidence 
when that evidence is not actually probative of the legal issues and 
excluding it furthers public policy.240  Excluding apologies because these 
same justifications apply, despite the possibility that some potential 
evidence could be lost in some cases, is a no-brainer. 
Perhaps most analogous to the apology context are statements 
provided in the course of settlement negotiations.  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 408 provides that “conduct or a statement made during 
compromise negotiations about the claim” is inadmissible for almost any 
purpose, including impeachment.241  Such excluded statements could, of 
course, include apologies,242 but they might also include other statements 
of a party’s interpretation of the “facts,” including, like apologies, an 
admission of fault and factual details related to liability.  These statements, 
when made in the context of settlement negotiations, are inadmissible.  
Period.  This is so even if the content was probative of the issues in the 
case and regardless of how valuable it would be to the offering party at 
trial—even if it included the “full confession” referenced above.243 
The Advisory Committee recognized two reasons such statements 
should be excluded, and both apply equally to apologies.  First, as the 
Advisory Committee explained, “[t]he evidence is irrelevant, since the 
offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any 
concession of weakness of position.”244  In other words, statements made 
in settlement negotiations, like statements made as part of an apology, are 
irrelevant because their content is not necessarily probative of legal 
liability.  Second, such statements are excluded because of the promotion 
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of public policy.245  With apologies, too, public policy is promoted when 
they are excluded. 
c. An evidentiary exclusion would not prevent discovery based on the 
content of the apology. 
Finally, and relatedly, excluding apologies from admission in court 
does not limit the ability of apology-receivers and their lawyers to use the 
content of those apologies in discovery.  In this way, too, any potential 
“loss” of evidence as a result of excluding apologies as evidence is 
mitigated.  The discovery rules are by nature broader than admissible 
evidence.246  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, parties may obtain 
discovery of relevant, nonprivileged information so long as the 
information sought is “proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”247  
Nothing in the proposed evidence rule would limit the application of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.  Similarly, no part of the proposed 
rule asks apology-receivers to unhear the content of the apology.  
Apology-receivers and their lawyers may use the content of the apology 
to guide their investigation in discovery.  To the extent the opinions 
expressed in an apology are supported by the underlying facts, an apology-
receiver may use those underlying facts to prove his case. 
Further, the supposed loss of evidence becomes even narrower when 
viewed with this discovery aspect in mind.  I noted above that the 
exclusion of apologies is presumably only of concern in the narrow span 
on the spectrum of liability in which liability is questionable and the 
presence of an apology would lead the fact-finder to conclude that the 
apologizer was liable when otherwise it would conclude that he was not.  
That is, the concern is only operative when the presence of an apology 
would tip the scales in favor of liability.  Given that the rule would not 
eliminate the discovery of facts related to such apologies, the area of 
concern becomes even narrower.  Excluding an apology would only 
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eliminate key evidence where the presence of the apology would tip the 
scales and where the facts underlying the apology could not be 
substantiated or supported in any other way.  This scenario calls into 
question whether this narrow circumstance is actually the precise 
circumstance under which the apology protection is most important: if the 
apology tips the scales and there is no other evidence of the supposed 
liability-proving facts than the apology, perhaps those facts are the result 
of erroneous counterfactual thinking that does not reflect actual 
blameworthiness and should not give rise to liability in any case. 
In sum, although it is true that there are hypothetical apology-receivers 
who would be deprived of the ability to present apologies as evidence of 
liability, this situation is not unlike other situations contemplated by 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the apology-receiver could still use the 
apology in discovery to gain access to relevant facts.  Indeed, because 
apologies are not ultimately probative of liability, their loss is not 
concerning. 
2. The risk of insincere apologies is overblown. 
A second critique suggests that protections might result in an increase 
in the number of insincere apologies, and studies show that apologies 
viewed as insincere could hinder the litigation process.  A common 
formulation of this argument is that “[e]videntiary exclusions rob 
apologies of their moral content and, in so doing, undermine the sincerity 
and, ultimately, the healing efficacy of apologies.”248 
First, because the overriding policy considerations for excluding 
apologies go beyond litigation efficiencies, there are reasons to encourage 
apologies even if some insincere apologies hinder the litigation process.  
The most common critique of this genre suggests that protection for 
apologies might result in strategic calculations in commercial settings, 
whereby commercial actors would choose to commit torts and then 
apologize because it would cost less than avoiding the harm in the first 
place.  This is similar to an efficient breach argument in the contract 
setting.  But, is there really any reason to think that actors undertake that 
kind of analysis when evaluating possible negligence?  Surely society does 
not expect that geriatric surgeons are less careful, or that drivers in the 
parking lot of a senior living facility are more likely to choose carelessness 
because the anticipated economic loss is less for the average older patient, 
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or that hospitals that largely treat Medicaid patients engage in fewer 
patient safety efforts because they calculate that economic losses for 
negligence are likely to be lower among this (on average) lower income 
population.  To the extent deterrence is a goal of the tort system, its 
intention is presumably to deter all forms of negligence because of the 
prospect of liability, not only those forms of negligence that are most 
costly. 
Finally, and importantly, Robbennolt found “no evidence to suggest 
that protected apologies will be less effective or less valued by claimants 
than unprotected apologies.”249 
3. The risk of inappropriate settlement assumes that the current tort 
system provides recovery for dignity injuries. 
A final critique of a rule protecting full apologies is that such a rule 
might result in injured parties accepting less than they should in settlement 
negotiations.250  But, legal value is the value the parties agree to or the jury 
awards, and to the extent the monetary value is being inflated due to the 
affront to dignity experienced by the harmed party, then apologies are a 
good thing because they address this separate harm.  One might argue that 
where a dignity injury is encouraging an injured party to seek the full 
amount of his damages, an apology that decreases that final number is a 
bad thing.  But, arguments that apologies reduce settlements to levels 
below that which adequately compensate victims effectively presumes 
that victims do not know what is best for them, place no value on the 
separate incompensable-under-the-legal-system dignity harm, and 
simultaneously place so much value on the redress of that harm that they 
devalue their other legal claims as soon as it has been remedied.  Even if 
this were true, this is why injured parties have lawyers.  Indeed, studies 
have confirmed that lawyers are inherently more skeptical of apologies 
than lay persons and would do well to advise their clients of the economic 
value of their claims.  In the usual negligence case, moreover, lawyers 
operate on a contingency fee arrangement, so encouraging their clients to 
accept settlement offers that fail to adequately compensate those clients 
for their injuries harms both the lawyer and his client. 
Note that one of the virtues extolled of apology programs in the 
medical malpractice context is that many claims are never brought or are 
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settled for small amounts without attorney involvement.  While in these 
circumstances a client is presumably not relying on counsel to ensure that 
she is not receiving less than she should for her injuries, that client is also 
not paying counsel, or court fees, which can easily reduce any award by 
nearly 50 percent.251 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Mistaken assumptions about the probative value of apologies lead to 
the erroneous inference that they are (and should be) admissible as 
evidence of legal fault.  Yet, psychological studies confirm that people 
apologize frequently in the absence of fault.  A moral analysis of apologies 
confirms that they are appropriate in circumstances where an individual is 
involved in a situation with a negative outcome.  Further, cultural evidence 
reflecting a disparate use of apologies along gender, status, and ethnic 
lines further reflects their lack of probative value.  When this lack of 
probative value is combined with the individual and societal benefits from 
apologies, encouraging their use makes good sense.  An exception in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence would ensure consistent treatment for apologies 
across jurisdictions, both because it would ensure consistent treatment in 
the federal system and because many states use the Federal Rules of 
Evidence as a model for their own evidentiary rules.  Such an exception is 
not novel; the Federal Rules of Evidence grant exceptions for other acts or 
statements that benefit society and individuals but have minimal probative 
value, e.g. subsequent remedial measures.  Apologies, too, should be 
excluded as an exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
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